Enjoy fast, free delivery, exclusive deals, and award-winning movies & TV shows with Prime
Try Prime
and start saving today with fast, free delivery
Amazon Prime includes:
Fast, FREE Delivery is available to Prime members. To join, select "Try Amazon Prime and start saving today with Fast, FREE Delivery" below the Add to Cart button.
Amazon Prime members enjoy:- Cardmembers earn 5% Back at Amazon.com with a Prime Credit Card.
- Unlimited Free Two-Day Delivery
- Streaming of thousands of movies and TV shows with limited ads on Prime Video.
- A Kindle book to borrow for free each month - with no due dates
- Listen to over 2 million songs and hundreds of playlists
- Unlimited photo storage with anywhere access
Important: Your credit card will NOT be charged when you start your free trial or if you cancel during the trial period. If you're happy with Amazon Prime, do nothing. At the end of the free trial, your membership will automatically upgrade to a monthly membership.
-10% $14.42$14.42
Ships from: Amazon.com Sold by: Amazon.com
$1.24$1.24
$3.98 delivery May 21 - 22
Ships from: glenthebookseller Sold by: glenthebookseller
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
OK
Audible sample Sample
Free Ride: How Digital Parasites Are Destroying the Culture Business, and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back Paperback – September 18, 2012
Purchase options and add-ons
On the Internet, “information wants to be free.” This memorable phrase shaped the online business model, but it is now driving the media companies on whom the digital industry feeds out of business. Today, newspaper stocks have fallen to all-time lows as papers are pressured to give away content, music sales have fallen by more than half since file sharing became common, TV ratings are plummeting as viewership migrates online, and publishers face off against Amazon over the price of digital books.
In Free Ride, Robert Levine narrates an epic tale of value destruction that moves from the corridors of Congress, where the law was passed that legalized YouTube, to the dorm room of Shawn Fanning, the founder of Napster; from the bargain-pricing dramas involving iTunes and Kindle to Google’s fateful decision to digitize first and ask questions later. Levine charts how the media industry lost control of its destiny and suggests innovative ways it can resist the pull of zero.
Fearless in its reporting and analysis, Free Ride is the business history of the decade and a much-needed call to action.
- Print length320 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherAnchor
- Publication dateSeptember 18, 2012
- Dimensions5.14 x 0.73 x 7.99 inches
- ISBN-100307739775
- ISBN-13978-0307739773
The Amazon Book Review
Book recommendations, author interviews, editors' picks, and more. Read it now.
Editorial Reviews
Review
“A book that should change the debate about the future of culture….With this stylishly written and well-reported manifesto, Levine has become a leading voice on one side of our most hotly contested debate involving law and technology.”
—Jeffrey Rosen, The New York Times Book Review
"Turbo-reported....Free Ride is a timely and impressive book--part guilt trip, part wake-up call, and full of the kind of reporting that could only have been done with a book advance from an Old Media company."
—Businessweek
"[A] smart, caustic tour of the modern culture industry."
—Fortune
“Brilliant…A crash course in the existential problems facing the [media].”
—Richard Morrison, The Times
“The most convincing defense of the current predicament of the creative industries that I have read.”
—James Crabtree, Financial Times
“With penetrating analysis and insight, Levine, a former executive editor of Billboard magazine, dissects the current economic climate of the struggling American media companies caught in the powerful fiscal grip of the digital industry…. This incisive book is a start at an informed dialogue.”
—Publishers Weekly
“Can the culture business survive the digital age? That’s the burning question Robert Levine poses in his provocative new book. And his answer is one that will get your blood boiling. Rich with revealing stories and telling tales, Free Ride makes a lucid case that information is actually expensive – and that it’s only the big technology firms profiting most from the work of others that demand information be free.”
—Gary Rivlin, author of Broke, USA
“One of the great issues of the digital age is how people who create content will be able to make a living. Robert Levine’s timely and well-researched book provides a valuable look at how copyright protection was lost on the internet and offers suggestions about how it could be restored.”
—Walter Isaacson, President/CEO of the Aspen Institute and author of Benjamin Franklin
“This book thoroughly documents a wide-spread outbreak of cyber amnesia. Despite libertarian delusions, industries often get Free Rides, especially in their early days, but they eventually give back. Taxpayers build roads, then get hired to build cars. The Internet gives back a lot in exchange for its Free Ride, but one thing it defiantly isn’t giving back is a way for enough people to make a living. No matter how amusing or addictive the Internet becomes, its foundation will crumble unless it starts returning the favors it was given and still depends on.”
—Jaron Lanier, author of You Are Not a Gadget
“Free Ride is a brilliantly written book that exposes the dark side of the Internet. A must read for anyone interested in the horrific undermining of our intellectual culture.”
—Edward Jay Epstein, author of The Big Picture: Money and Power in Hollywood
“Robert Levine deftly dissects the self-serving Orwellian freedom-speak being served up by Silicon Valley’s digital new lords as they amass fortunes devaluing the work of artists, journalists and other old-fashioned ‘content creators.’ Free Ride begs us to remove our blinders and take a hard look down a cultural dead-end road.”
—Fred Goodman, author of Fortune’s Fool: Edgar Bronfman Jr., Warner Music, and an Industry in Crisis
“Without being a Luddite, Levine makes the phony digital media gurus of our day seem as simple-minded as their slogans.”
—Ron Rosenbaum, author of How the End Begins and Explaining Hitler
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
In March 2007, the former Clinton administration official who helped shape the Internet as we know it finally admitted his policy hadn't worked.
Hunched over a tabletop microphone at a copyright conference hosted by McGill University in Montreal, Canada, Bruce Lehman talked about the effects of a law hated by most of the academics in his audience. As Clinton's commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Lehman ran the National Information Infrastructure Task Force Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. Assigned by the White House to set rules of the road for the emerging Internet, he championed policies that became the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a law that was supposed to extend copyright to the online world without slowing its growth. Instead, it became a prime example of the law of unintended consequences.
"Unfortunately, at least in some areas, our policies haven't worked out too well," Lehman admitted, looking vaguely uncomfortable in a tan jacket and red tie. He put some of the blame on music and movie companies that didn't act quickly enough to develop new business models for the digital age. But considerable blame also goes to the law he helped design.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a compromise between media conglomerates on the one hand and telecom companies on the other, devastated the first group and helped the second soar. As Lehman recommended, the law makes it illegal to circumvent copy-protection technology, such as the encryption on DVDs and some digital downloads, or distribute a tool to do so. It also gives "safe harbor" to Internet service providers and some online companies so they're not liable for copyright infringement based on the actions of users. That safe harbor made it easier for sites like YouTube to become valuable forums for amateur creativity. But it also let them build big businesses out of professional content they didn't pay for.
Until he started working on the Clinton administration's online policy, Lehman was best known as the first openly gay man to get a high-level government position through the Senate confirmation process. But his role as head of the patent office gave him significant authority. The top U.S. copyright official is the register of copyrights, who works in the Library of Congress, in the legislative branch of government. So Lehman emerged as the closest thing the executive branch had to a "copyright czar."
Many of the professors in Lehman's audience believed the law's "anticircumvention" provision interferes with free speech, since it makes it difficult to digitally copy music or movie scenes in order to remix or excerpt them for purposes of commentary. But Lehman was more upset that the music business was dying and other parts of the entertainment industry were facing similar problems, because the anticircumvention policy he pushed for didn't make up for the devastation caused by the safe harbor provision to which he reluctantly agreed.
Like most of the government officials he worked with in the Clinton administration, he thought digital technology would help the U.S. media business, not threaten to destroy it.
Although it might seem hard to believe now, there was a time when copyright law was of interest mostly to copyright lawyers. It's a complicated topic, intellectually abstract even to most attorneys. But as digital technology makes it faster and easier to copy music and movies, consumers are more inclined to wonder when exactly they're breaking the law.
The answers aren't always obvious. Duplicating a CD may or may not be legal, depending on the purpose of the copy. (DVDs, which have copy protection, are covered by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.) Many other issues raised by new technology fall into a gray area, and the prohibitive cost of litigation tends to keep some of them there for a while.
In the United States, the Constitution gives Congress the authority "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Over the years, that definition grew to include film and music--first compositions, then recordings. And Congress repeatedly extended those "limited Times," from twenty-eight years to, in 1976, fifty years after the death of the author.
In the United States, copyright is primarily an economic instrument, a government-granted monopoly on the right to sell a work--for a limited time and with some exceptions. Until recently, the media business controlled its products by maintaining the exclusive right to copy them--hence, copyright. Depending on the nature of the work in question, this can include the right to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display it. When media was distributed physically--on paper or on disc--the first two mattered most and almost always overlapped.
To understand copyright as a monopoly, think of a performer like Bruce Springsteen, whose recordings are owned by Columbia Records under the terms of his recording contract, which assigns those rights to the label. In practical terms, Columbia has the exclusive right to sell his recordings. Since the market has only one legitimate supplier of Springsteen albums, the label can basically set its price. This monopoly is meant to compensate Columbia for investing in Springsteen, who in turn receives royalties as well as marketing and promotional support. Like any monopoly, copyright keeps the price of Springsteen albums higher than they otherwise would be, especially if they could be freely transferred online. But the monopoly is very narrow; it doesn't extend to rock anthems about New Jersey, or even to other artists' recordings of Springsteen's songs. And by allowing artists to make money on their work--either by selling it or by making an arrangement with a company that can--copyright gives them an incentive to produce more of it.
Although the logic behind copyright hasn't changed much, the laws themselves have always adjusted to new technologies, from piano rolls to cable television. Until relatively recently, most conflicts about copyright laws involved companies within, or at least close to, the businesses that depended on them. When songwriters wanted to make sure they received royalties when other performers recorded their compositions--a right they were granted in the Copyright Act of 1909--they faced off against another part of the music business. The opposing companies didn't challenge the thinking behind copyright, because their own businesses relied on it as well.
The copyright dispute that changed that--and set the stage for the battles over the online world--was Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., sometimes called the Betamax case. In 1976, several movie studios sued Sony to establish that the company, which did not own a studio itself at the time, would have secondary liability for copyright infringement committed with its videocassette recorder. (Sony's Betamax was a proprietary technology that quickly lost market share to the VHS.) After eight years of legal battles, the Supreme Court essentially legalized the VCR in a 5-4 ruling that held Sony wasn't subject to liability on the grounds that the device was "capable of substantial non-infringing uses."
The Betamax case was the first major legal issue to set copyright holders against an industry with interests radically different from their own. Beneath all the overheated rhetoric--the Motion Picture Association of America's chief executive, Jack Valenti, famously said, "The VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone"--the dispute had its roots in an economic conflict very much like the one that exists online today. Movie studios wanted to sell films in a format that couldn't also be used to copy them, such as the LaserDisc technology introduced in 1978. (Whether this could have succeeded in a market without the VCR is hard to know.) Electronics makers realized that consumers preferred--and might pay more for--a machine that could also record movies and television shows.
The Betamax case also shows why secondary liability is both important and controversial. No one disputed that it was illegal to duplicate a store-bought videocassette in order to sell copies, just as no one disputes the illegality of uploading an entire television show to YouTube today. But it's impractical, if not impossible, to police this kind of private behavior. So although neither Sony nor YouTube would commit direct copyright infringement, rights holders had an interest in holding them liable for secondary copyright infringement. In some cases, when a particular tool can be used for practically anything, this seems absurd: no one seriously suggests that carmakers should be liable if their vehicles are used in robberies. But it seems equally unrealistic to argue that a Web site called the Pirate Bay should have no responsibility whatsoever for the infringement it encourages. No auto manufacturer has ever marketed a product called the Getaway Car, complete with a device that switches license plates while the vehicle is in motion in order to evade police.
The Supreme Court's Betamax decision also complicated copyright by holding that "time-shifting"--recording broadcast television for later viewing--qualified as "fair use." The judicial doctrine of fair use provides an exception to copyright law to prevent it from placing undue limits on free speech. It allows journalists, scholars, and artists to quote or excerpt works in order to comment on them. (How much can be taken legally depends on the purpose and length of the excerpt, the nature of the work itself, and its effect on the work's value.) By deciding that it also applied to consumers' use of media, the Supreme Court opened up a range of issues that are still being debated today.
Although many anticopyright activists refer to fair use as a right, it's really an affirmative defense of copyright infringement--that is, one that acknowledges the act was committed but maintains that it's legal. "People who call it a right are just doing that to emphasize their politics," says David Nimmer, a UCLA Law School professor who with his father wrote Nimmer on Copyright, a treatise that has become the standard reference work on the subject for lawyers.
As soon as Lehman introduced the idea of an anticircumvention law in 1994, fair use became a rallying cry for activists who claimed that music and movie companies were trying to restrict it--along with free speech. If it became illegal to crack copy-protection systems, consumers wouldn't be able to make otherwise legal backup copies for personal use--a reasonable concern for $200 software packages but not really such a big deal for $15 DVDs. More important, some argued, it would be impossible to express ideas by remixing music or quoting text.
Courts have not agreed, since those who want to comment on a work using the work itself can retype a passage of text or record music on tape. When defendants who had distributed the code that unlocks DVDs argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act represented an unconstitutional restriction of fair use, the court rejected this as an "extravagant claim." "We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the original." Desirable as it might be, convenience is not a right.
As with the Supreme Court's Betamax case, the debate over the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was an economic conflict dressed up in rhetoric about rights. On one side were the major labels and studios, at the height of their power and with good connections in the White House. On the other were electronics manufacturers, telecom companies, and Internet idealists--groups that hadn't yet worked together and didn't even seem to have much in common. But they would end up influencing the law just as much.
Product details
- Publisher : Anchor; Reprint edition (September 18, 2012)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 320 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0307739775
- ISBN-13 : 978-0307739773
- Item Weight : 8.3 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.14 x 0.73 x 7.99 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #4,357,911 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #739 in Entertainment Industry
- #1,435 in Media & Communications Industry (Books)
- #5,008 in Company Business Profiles (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author
Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
This is why I was pleasantly surprised by this book. It's a fascinating history of the rise of digital piracy as it affected (and affects) the major "content" businesses (Music, Newspapers, Publishing, Television, and Film), and particularly the divide between the digital technology companies (such as Google) and the content industries. Quite often, I finished a chapter of the book much more sympathetic to these businesses than I had been before, particularly when Levine really delves into the economics of the "content" businesses and the piracy affecting them. While I don't entirely agree with him (at times, I think he's a little too wed to the idea of keeping the content businesses large and stable), I strongly recommend this book to any interested in these topics.
Levine focuses on those five main "content" businesses, but the real heart of the book (the most researched and detailed, including Levine's proposal for dealing with piracy) lie in the sections about the Music Industry. He goes into great detail about how digital piracy unfolded on the industry in the form of Napster, File-Sharing, and Digital Lockers, and how the Music Industry reacted to these changes (and the proliferation of digital technology plus the web). Particularly interesting to me was his writings on the economics of the Music Industry and each method of distributing music (such as CD Albums versus iTunes singles), as well as the details about the rise and fall of Napster in the late 1990s.
It is from the Music Industry that Levine also draws his proposal for resolving the issue of getting rights-holders paid for the use of their content on the web: "Blanket Licenses", or the right for people to use all the music they want as long as they pay for the license to an organization that then distributes the revenue (or if they subscribe to services that do this). He points out that this is already a system in place for paying songwriters and music publishing, and that several European telecoms/Internet Service Providers (such as TDC in the Netherlands). There is increasing support for it in continental Europe, although the US music industry continues to be wary.
This is not to dismiss the rest of the book. Levine also delves quite well into how e-books are changing the Publishing Industry, mostly in the context of the conflict between tech companies that want to sell book-reading devices using books as a "loss leader", and the actual publishing companies that are afraid that this "loss leading" will destroy any other retailers who can't afford to take a loss on book sales to sell physical readers. He makes a very convincing argument that it was foolish for newspapers to put all their articles online for free, instead of reserving most of them for subscribers (particularly the more profitable "print" subscribers that usually account for more than 90% of a newspaper's revenue). Levine points out that Online Video is a major threat to cable television, the heart of the modern television business (their reaction is "TV Everywhere", allowing anyone with a cable subscription to watch television shows and movies on any devices they own). And quite frequently, Levine points out the divide between the technology companies that have benefited from a "free web" that permits piracy (such as Youtube getting popular on the back of pirated video content that users post), and the content providers hurt by this. A great deal of his anger is particularly reserved for Google, which has been a major player in dampening efforts to strengthen copyright enforcement online.
That is not to say that I agree wholeheartedly with Levine on these issues. His chapters on the newspaper business are very convincing, and I'm much more sympathetic to the television and music businesses after reading this book. Nonetheless, I think Levine has a bias towards high-priced, professional content output, such as high-priced shows on cable subscriptions. There are several points in the book where he's dismissive towards amateurs and "hobbyists", and I get the impression that he would gladly make the trade-off of higher cable prices for higher-priced (and presumably better) content such as "Mad Men". That's a fair opinion, but it's like complaints about how the quality of air travel degraded after de-regulation allowed cheaper airfare prices in the US: quality was lost, but far more people had access and the ability to enter the market. It's important not to get too wedded to the present state of the "content" market, fears about a "twenty-first century economy with a seventeeth-century content business" aside.
Despite some of my disagreements with Levine, I DO wholeheartedly recommend that you read this book. It's an excellent piece, both readable and well-supported, from a perspective that tends to be dismissed as entirely self-serving and "luddite" in the debates over digital piracy.
Overall the book is worth reading. It is honest, passionate, well researched and provides an interesting analysis. I found it really enlightening in pointing out the economic incentives of tech companies behind their support of the romantic view of a free internet and how their business drive affects not only media intermediaries but, most importantly, creators.
This book stands as a rare counterbalance to the pro-piracy chorus. It's obviously frustrating to be on the dissenting side of one of these trans-national cultural movements, but the author is able to make his case in a way that is nonetheless entertaining and insightful. He deftly meshes solid legal analysis with neat stories.
The strongest part of the book is unquestionably his detailed analysis of the effect of copyright erosion generally, and specifically on the music industry. Indeed, the analysis here is far and away the best I have seen. Levine goes back to the Statute of Anne, and carefully traces several key cases, including Acuff-Rose, Sony, the extension acts, and so on, since. His legal analysis is spot on and accurate, and I was frankly quite surprised that he was not a lawyer. (Perhaps he ought to have pointed out that all most material is in fact copyrighted at the time of creation - sometimes he seems to use "copyright" for "registered copyright" in a few places, as when he talks about the percentage of copyrighted material among some network, but this is minor).
He has a terrific historical analysis of the history of copy protection, attempts to copy protect CDs, and various failed industry standards. His treatment of the Metallica stance on copyright is superb if poignant. He carefully and accurately traces through things like Napster, Kazaa, and later iTunes, and the effect of all these on revenues. Overall, these chapters are certainly worth the price of the book.
His discussion of film and movie piracy is also careful and persuasive. He also has a very good overview of book publishing economics and why, for example, Kindles are not quite the boon to authors that Kindle owners like to pontificate about.
I did disagree with the author in a couple of places. First, I felt he made too big a deal about Boxee, some sort of television device I'd never heard of. (The author likewise doesn't discuss the possibility of desktop computers replacing TVs - only mentioning laptops, tablets, etc.).
Second, I felt Levine's treatment of Google Books was unfair. Levine correctly notes that some publishers and authors objected because they might want to reprint books that are currently out-of-print. But Levine ignores the fact that these authors could easily opt out of Google Books if they wanted to. Levine also ignores the problem of "orphan books", where copyright is hard to ascertain and the owners don't care enough to bargain, which requires an opt-out system for Google Books to work. Levine cites the argument that Google Books should be disallowed from becoming a full library because doing so could prevent other companies like Microsoft from making a similar effort. But the companies leading the charge against Google Books have no intention of making such a project, nor will they ever. It seems odd to prevent Google from doing something with the argument that if Google succeeds, other companies won't in the future.
One interesting point, by the way, that the book glossed over was how often antitrust considerations prevented the many relatively small content creation businesses or artists from joining together effectively to promulgate new standards or new partnerships. With the very loose confederations that are less likely to raise antitrust issues, it is extremely difficult to get the buy-in from the production and distribution chain required to make the standard effective.
Still, overall the book is fun, it's entertaining, it's accurate, and it's fair.
Top reviews from other countries
The author explains how our information economy is headed for a place where information
isn't worth anything in an environment of piracy.
He approaches the subject in a fair way balancing his comments between user and producer.