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The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost
Cathal Nolan's The Allure of Battle shows that while wars have shaped the history of the modern world, their outcomes are decided by many other factors. The book argues that major battles are not decisive to the outcome of wars; rather, wars depend on longer-term attrition in which the side that wins gradually and remorselessly overwhelms the other with larger arsenals and greater reserves of manpower. To illustrate his argument, Nolan draws on conflicts throughout the world and throughout history (aside from classical or medieval warfare, which, he argues, had greatly different natures from each other and from early modern and modern warfare).
The Allure of Battle systematically examines a series of great battles, each described in the standard literature as the "turning point" of the war in which they occurred. It asks how they actually fit in the histories of those wars and military history more generally. In each case Nolan will show that even huge and important battles, which are widely considered to have been decisive, actually and mainly contributed to victory or defeat by compressing attrition, which is what in the end led to the outcome of each and every war. He will also illustrate how the character of longer wars of attrition also fundamentally shaped extended periods of postwar peace, that military, moral, and matériel exhaustion rather than battlefield supremacy per se was determinative. Nolan is not proposing to have discovered linear or universal laws about modern military history, nor is he attempting a theory of war. His point is to look at battles within the context of the wider conflict in which they took place. The result is an accessible, provocative, and even entertaining book that will reflect fresh thinking in the historical community about the conduct of warfare in terms that will appreciated by a wider readership.
The Allure of Battle systematically examines a series of great battles, each described in the standard literature as the "turning point" of the war in which they occurred. It asks how they actually fit in the histories of those wars and military history more generally. In each case Nolan will show that even huge and important battles, which are widely considered to have been decisive, actually and mainly contributed to victory or defeat by compressing attrition, which is what in the end led to the outcome of each and every war. He will also illustrate how the character of longer wars of attrition also fundamentally shaped extended periods of postwar peace, that military, moral, and matériel exhaustion rather than battlefield supremacy per se was determinative. Nolan is not proposing to have discovered linear or universal laws about modern military history, nor is he attempting a theory of war. His point is to look at battles within the context of the wider conflict in which they took place. The result is an accessible, provocative, and even entertaining book that will reflect fresh thinking in the historical community about the conduct of warfare in terms that will appreciated by a wider readership.
728 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2017
About the author
Cathal J. Nolan
20 books38 followersCathal J. Nolan is Professor of History and Director of the International History Institute at Boston University.
The Allure of Battle: A History of Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford UP, 2017), won the Gilder Lehrman Prize for Military History, as "the best book on military history in the English-speaking world, distinguished by its scholarship, contribution to the literature, and appeal to both a general and an academic audience." In 2019 it was named the first ever "Distinguished Book" by War on the Rocks, which deemed it "essential reading for national security professionals."
Nolan also publishes future military fiction under the pen name Kali Altsoba. His series The Orion War has reached seven volumes (and counting). His new series, on future space naval and marine war, is White Sails. Volume I, Destroyer, will be published in June 2020.
The Allure of Battle: A History of Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford UP, 2017), won the Gilder Lehrman Prize for Military History, as "the best book on military history in the English-speaking world, distinguished by its scholarship, contribution to the literature, and appeal to both a general and an academic audience." In 2019 it was named the first ever "Distinguished Book" by War on the Rocks, which deemed it "essential reading for national security professionals."
Nolan also publishes future military fiction under the pen name Kali Altsoba. His series The Orion War has reached seven volumes (and counting). His new series, on future space naval and marine war, is White Sails. Volume I, Destroyer, will be published in June 2020.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 47 reviews
May 2, 2017
This is a book that needs to be read. I have for many years (decades) felt that the whole concept of one great battle that will make a world historical impact is overblown. We hear of masterpieces such as Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. Yet, less than a decade later, his empire was falling into ruin. So what made Austerlitz a decisive battle? Hannibal and Cannae? Who ended up winning that war? Not Hannibal. The German Wehrmacht's extraordinary victories at the outset if the Russian invasion. . . . Within a year, the tide was turning. Or the German attack, via the Schlieffen Plan, at the outset of World War I. Great victories at the outset. But stalemate followed.
The book makes a key point. Many battles that are looked at as masterpieces by the victor or seen as decisive battles have only short-term effect. Think of Agincourt and Crecy. Extraordinary English victories. But did the English ultimately retain control of French territory? Nope.
Often, early and dramatic victories in a campaign slow down and turn into wars of attrition. And the economic power of countries who had earlier lost battles can turn into long-term victory.
A useful corrective against overestimating the long-term value of spectacular wins in battle.
The book makes a key point. Many battles that are looked at as masterpieces by the victor or seen as decisive battles have only short-term effect. Think of Agincourt and Crecy. Extraordinary English victories. But did the English ultimately retain control of French territory? Nope.
Often, early and dramatic victories in a campaign slow down and turn into wars of attrition. And the economic power of countries who had earlier lost battles can turn into long-term victory.
A useful corrective against overestimating the long-term value of spectacular wins in battle.
June 26, 2017
The book makes the important point that wars are not won by decisive battles or genius generals, but by attrition, resources and long defensive strategies. As a supporter of longue durée history by the Annales school, I cannot applaud this insight enough. Especially as I come from a country which has long promoted the glory of decisive battles and has been lured by it into two destructive world wars. The two World Wars are strong examples of wars that have been won by attrition. The Allied powers had more soldiers, tanks, ships, vehicles, arms, ammunition, planes, oil, coal, steel, territory, money, industrial capacity more everything than the Axis powers - and that is why they won the war. That does not mean that soldiers did not fight heroically and courageously, that generals did not commanded virtuously, and that movies and books cannot legitimately celebrate those virtues. But it is not to be confused with the cause for victory of defeat. There was no decisive battle, ingenious general or heroic soldier who made the difference to the outcome of the World Wars.
The problem with this book is that the following 600 pages do not add much to the initial insight. The point is so simple that it does not need any theoretical development and the empirics are detailed and tedious. I assume this will be one of those influential works that everyone cites, but no one reads (at least not completely).
The problem with this book is that the following 600 pages do not add much to the initial insight. The point is so simple that it does not need any theoretical development and the empirics are detailed and tedious. I assume this will be one of those influential works that everyone cites, but no one reads (at least not completely).
December 13, 2022
Decisive battles don't win wars?
The author definitely has a way with words, in print and at presentation. He views war as hopeless and eternal, something to not get into casually. One needs to consider: truly decisive battles rarely happen. Usually, war is a test of endurance, lasting way, way, way longer than expected, with one conflict leading to another, leading to another. Often generals will sign up to lead with strategies that promise unrealistic victorious timelines to politicians who themselves have never been to war. They all fail to consider what they will do if their initial plans fail and the war goes big and long, in other words, the “brilliantly planned” decisive battle becomes a war, eventually turning into a series of protracted attritional wars in a survival-of-the-fittest contest.
In the author’s view wars (much more important than battles) are won virtually always by exhausting the enemy’s morale and matériel, by superior social organization and a deep capacity for logistics, by the enemy’s cultural decline, his governing elite’s and army’s corruption, his protracted civil wars, his military mutining, and his leaders living in fear of assassination. Thus, as the author writes “…wars are not so much won on the battlefield as they are in the treasury and by endurance, by tapping into deeper social strength and political support and then outlasting the other side.”
To prove his point, the author provides the reader with a mammoth history of warfare, its theory and practice. He surveys battles and wars and draws conclusions. He shows how attack methods prompt defense methods that prompt new attack methods that prompt new defense methods, and so on, evolving into a more and more deadly spiral.
In developing his thesis (that decisive battles don’t win wars), the author looks at warfare through a number of lens-like perspectives, with a chapter (16 in total) devoted to each: battle in history, battle retarded, battle remembered, battle reformed, battle with reason, battle restored, battle decisive, battle defeated, battle exalted, battle of annihilation, annihilation of battle, annihilation of strategy, annihilation of nations, annihilation of mercy, annihilation at sea, and annihilation of illusions.
Overall, the book is very well-written and researched, and highly recommended for any serious military library.
While pondering Mr. Nolan’s conclusion, here’s another book to consider: Strategic Advantage: How to Win in War, Business, and Life
The author definitely has a way with words, in print and at presentation. He views war as hopeless and eternal, something to not get into casually. One needs to consider: truly decisive battles rarely happen. Usually, war is a test of endurance, lasting way, way, way longer than expected, with one conflict leading to another, leading to another. Often generals will sign up to lead with strategies that promise unrealistic victorious timelines to politicians who themselves have never been to war. They all fail to consider what they will do if their initial plans fail and the war goes big and long, in other words, the “brilliantly planned” decisive battle becomes a war, eventually turning into a series of protracted attritional wars in a survival-of-the-fittest contest.
In the author’s view wars (much more important than battles) are won virtually always by exhausting the enemy’s morale and matériel, by superior social organization and a deep capacity for logistics, by the enemy’s cultural decline, his governing elite’s and army’s corruption, his protracted civil wars, his military mutining, and his leaders living in fear of assassination. Thus, as the author writes “…wars are not so much won on the battlefield as they are in the treasury and by endurance, by tapping into deeper social strength and political support and then outlasting the other side.”
To prove his point, the author provides the reader with a mammoth history of warfare, its theory and practice. He surveys battles and wars and draws conclusions. He shows how attack methods prompt defense methods that prompt new attack methods that prompt new defense methods, and so on, evolving into a more and more deadly spiral.
In developing his thesis (that decisive battles don’t win wars), the author looks at warfare through a number of lens-like perspectives, with a chapter (16 in total) devoted to each: battle in history, battle retarded, battle remembered, battle reformed, battle with reason, battle restored, battle decisive, battle defeated, battle exalted, battle of annihilation, annihilation of battle, annihilation of strategy, annihilation of nations, annihilation of mercy, annihilation at sea, and annihilation of illusions.
Overall, the book is very well-written and researched, and highly recommended for any serious military library.
While pondering Mr. Nolan’s conclusion, here’s another book to consider: Strategic Advantage: How to Win in War, Business, and Life
June 28, 2017
Despite my rating, I think this is pretty much a "must read" as a good summary work. even if you don't agree with the author's premise, there is plenty of food for thought. There are several provisos, though. For one thing, there is no formal bibliography; all the reference works are covered in the notes. I found this a bit distracting, especially when I wished to refer to the works in question.
Nolan is definitely not a "Great Man of History" proponent. His comments on Marlborough, for instance, are quite harsh, especially given Marlborough's almost universal hagiographic coverage. I also found his opinions on Napoleon a little disconcerting and, at times, contradictory. With all the sources available, for instance, Nolan relies significantly on an iconoclastic outlier, Owen Connelly's Blundering to Glory as an oft-cited reference. For a work that essentially criticizes the "great battles" theory of warfare (fair enough), he makes references to a number of decisive Napoleonic battles; his thesis is that Napoleon lost essentially because he didn't know when to stop and eventually was overwhelmed. Fair enough, certainly, but one is left to wonder what his opinion might have been if Napoleon had stopped in 1809,
I found his position on WW I far more problematical and in outright error in some places. Again, Nolan relies on an iconoclastic work, in this case Geoffrey Wawro's A Mad Catastrophe. I have read a number of Wawro's works and generally have them in high regard, save for this one, which I found to be just short of vindictive (against Austria-Hungary). In the case of Nolan, it led to some outright errors. In the case of the Italian Front, Nolan claims that the Austrians only held due to the presence of German troops stiffening the front. In fact, Italy was not at war with Germany until August, 1916, after the Seventh Battle of the Isonzo (and after the Strafexedition). Further, Germans never had more than 4-6 divisions against Italy and that only for Caporetto, after which they were withdrawn. Contrary to Nolan's assertion, the Austrians gave a good account of themselves against Italy without any help. Morale in the A-H Army may have been bad but the Italian front was an exception; morale there only broke at the very end, when the war was obviously lost.
He also lost me when he cited Paul Baumer's assertion, in All Quiet on the Western Front that Germany only lost WW I by being primarily overwhelmed by men and material as being in error, then makes a similar statement three pages later (pages 398 - 402, give or take). So which is it?
Having said all this, the book has much to recommend it and his point of view does have much to recommend. Although glamorous, there is much to the myth of decisive battles, including both the definition and the battles which are included therein. But some of this book is akin to shelling a peanut with a sledgehammer; you'll get to the nut but there is a lot of collateral damage in the process.
Nolan is definitely not a "Great Man of History" proponent. His comments on Marlborough, for instance, are quite harsh, especially given Marlborough's almost universal hagiographic coverage. I also found his opinions on Napoleon a little disconcerting and, at times, contradictory. With all the sources available, for instance, Nolan relies significantly on an iconoclastic outlier, Owen Connelly's Blundering to Glory as an oft-cited reference. For a work that essentially criticizes the "great battles" theory of warfare (fair enough), he makes references to a number of decisive Napoleonic battles; his thesis is that Napoleon lost essentially because he didn't know when to stop and eventually was overwhelmed. Fair enough, certainly, but one is left to wonder what his opinion might have been if Napoleon had stopped in 1809,
I found his position on WW I far more problematical and in outright error in some places. Again, Nolan relies on an iconoclastic work, in this case Geoffrey Wawro's A Mad Catastrophe. I have read a number of Wawro's works and generally have them in high regard, save for this one, which I found to be just short of vindictive (against Austria-Hungary). In the case of Nolan, it led to some outright errors. In the case of the Italian Front, Nolan claims that the Austrians only held due to the presence of German troops stiffening the front. In fact, Italy was not at war with Germany until August, 1916, after the Seventh Battle of the Isonzo (and after the Strafexedition). Further, Germans never had more than 4-6 divisions against Italy and that only for Caporetto, after which they were withdrawn. Contrary to Nolan's assertion, the Austrians gave a good account of themselves against Italy without any help. Morale in the A-H Army may have been bad but the Italian front was an exception; morale there only broke at the very end, when the war was obviously lost.
He also lost me when he cited Paul Baumer's assertion, in All Quiet on the Western Front that Germany only lost WW I by being primarily overwhelmed by men and material as being in error, then makes a similar statement three pages later (pages 398 - 402, give or take). So which is it?
Having said all this, the book has much to recommend it and his point of view does have much to recommend. Although glamorous, there is much to the myth of decisive battles, including both the definition and the battles which are included therein. But some of this book is akin to shelling a peanut with a sledgehammer; you'll get to the nut but there is a lot of collateral damage in the process.
December 29, 2017
Extremely thorough, but lacking focus.
The book's premise is to describe the ways in which wars are actually won, claiming that "decisive" battles seldom lead to victory. The real decisive factor, it says, is the attrition of men and materiel during long campaigns,a fact seldom envisioned by the men who start "short and lively" wars.
And yet, most of the book deals with describing in great detail a number of "decisive" battles, down to the tactical, and sometimes even micro-tactical, level. While very interesting, this is totally redundant. A description of the battle's supposedly decisive outcome and the following strategic results would have sufficed, while adding weight to the author's claims.
In a way, this book reads like a classic "History's Greatest Battles" compilation, a once popular genre of military history. While the scholary work is undoubtedly very impressive, most of it does not serve the book's thesis. Surprisingly, while many so-called decisive battles and campaigns are described in great detail, the American Civil War is absent. This is a glaring omission, as it was the first modern war in which a delibarate shift from manoeuvre to attrition took place. Instead, we get many intellectual asides, from a critique of Napoleon's character to the morality of Allied bombing campaigns against German and Japanese cities. All very intetesting, but totally unrelated to the book's thesis.
In the end, Nolan backsteps from his premise, explaining that the divorce between tactics and strategy is the reason for failure in war. He rightly asserts that material supriority is never enough, and must be accompanied by competent generals and brave troops. In other words, Napoleon and Hitler were mistaken in NOT seeing war as "a continuation of policy by other means", and not vice versa.
In conclusion: while impressive in scope and ambition, the book falls short of convincing. However, it is a recommended read, if only as a good summary of modern European military history.
The book's premise is to describe the ways in which wars are actually won, claiming that "decisive" battles seldom lead to victory. The real decisive factor, it says, is the attrition of men and materiel during long campaigns,a fact seldom envisioned by the men who start "short and lively" wars.
And yet, most of the book deals with describing in great detail a number of "decisive" battles, down to the tactical, and sometimes even micro-tactical, level. While very interesting, this is totally redundant. A description of the battle's supposedly decisive outcome and the following strategic results would have sufficed, while adding weight to the author's claims.
In a way, this book reads like a classic "History's Greatest Battles" compilation, a once popular genre of military history. While the scholary work is undoubtedly very impressive, most of it does not serve the book's thesis. Surprisingly, while many so-called decisive battles and campaigns are described in great detail, the American Civil War is absent. This is a glaring omission, as it was the first modern war in which a delibarate shift from manoeuvre to attrition took place. Instead, we get many intellectual asides, from a critique of Napoleon's character to the morality of Allied bombing campaigns against German and Japanese cities. All very intetesting, but totally unrelated to the book's thesis.
In the end, Nolan backsteps from his premise, explaining that the divorce between tactics and strategy is the reason for failure in war. He rightly asserts that material supriority is never enough, and must be accompanied by competent generals and brave troops. In other words, Napoleon and Hitler were mistaken in NOT seeing war as "a continuation of policy by other means", and not vice versa.
In conclusion: while impressive in scope and ambition, the book falls short of convincing. However, it is a recommended read, if only as a good summary of modern European military history.
January 5, 2020
This book was a great survey of (mostly Western) wars from Ancient Greece to World War II that argues that most wars are decided more by attrition than decisive battles. I was hoping that it would delve into a discussion and analysis of the differing evidence and opinions, but it is more of a historical narrative. This book tells the story of how how most societies and militaries seek a swift decisive battle to start and end wars, but how it usually devolves into a war of attrition.
"How to win decisively in war is the aspiration of all professional military, and a main subject of concern to those who study war. Yet it is the single hardest thing to do, to translate combat into achievement of an important strategic and political goal that the other side is forced to recognize and accept when the war is over" (p.572).
I really liked the chapters covering up to World War I (chapters 1-12, up to page 403) and I thought the author did a great job covering two counter-examples: the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Chapters 13 and beyond (covering World War II) get a bit repetitive and preachy. An example is the repeated mantra that Germany simply sought to "punch another hole and keep winning" (p.468). Or the repeated return to Germany's Rassenkrieg "race war." The author could have raised these points without devoting as many pages to them, thereby sticking more closely to his thesis.
Finally, I wished the author had continued his analysis into some of the more modern wars. What about the Vietnam War or the Yom Kippur War? Was the First Gulf War decided by a decisive battle? Or was the 2003 Iraq War really a continuation of the same war, negating its decisiveness?
"How to win decisively in war is the aspiration of all professional military, and a main subject of concern to those who study war. Yet it is the single hardest thing to do, to translate combat into achievement of an important strategic and political goal that the other side is forced to recognize and accept when the war is over" (p.572).
I really liked the chapters covering up to World War I (chapters 1-12, up to page 403) and I thought the author did a great job covering two counter-examples: the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Chapters 13 and beyond (covering World War II) get a bit repetitive and preachy. An example is the repeated mantra that Germany simply sought to "punch another hole and keep winning" (p.468). Or the repeated return to Germany's Rassenkrieg "race war." The author could have raised these points without devoting as many pages to them, thereby sticking more closely to his thesis.
Finally, I wished the author had continued his analysis into some of the more modern wars. What about the Vietnam War or the Yom Kippur War? Was the First Gulf War decided by a decisive battle? Or was the 2003 Iraq War really a continuation of the same war, negating its decisiveness?
August 12, 2017
This was probably the most remarkable book on military history that I’ve ever read. The center point is that the draw of the decisive battle has blinded the minds of political and military leaders for the last two centuries. It is attrition that wins wars and brings defeat. The short war after a decisive battle fantasy has let down several aggressor nations in that time period. This is a great resource and very detailed and convincing in its central points. I recommend reading this to any student of military history.
June 25, 2017
This book is filled with stunning, inarguable truths about battle and wars and geopolitics and human nature through recorded human history.
The human nature part is mostly depressing. Nolan’s copiously documented conclusion is that mankind has spilled blood for millennia, praised “noble, decisive” battle, and failed to invent any way of making war that makes sense or is strategically effective.
Nolan says that generals and armies and kings and governments nearly always find ways to lose wars, and hardly ever find ways to win wars.
The “allure of battle” hides the grisly truth: almost without exception, battles don’t win wars. Almost always, one of the combatants finally throws in the towel after losing soldiers, weapons, and wealth, and after suffering the withering economic and social effects of war by attrition.
The winner doesn’t win by noble deeds and glorious victories…the winner “wins” because the loser finally gives up.
One trenchant excerpt:
“…with few exceptions, the major power wars of the past several centuries were in the end decided by grinding exhaustion more than by the operational art of even the greatest of the modern great captains.” (pp. 9-10)
From Nolan’s conclusion in The Allure of Battle:
“First, beware the vanity of nations and the hubris of leaders, civilian and military…There is grave danger to youth forced into uniform by the hurried ambitions of old men who never wore one…Also, from those who did, but who lost the wars of their youth, and grew grim and determined to try again…Second, always be deeply skeptical of short-war plans and promises of easy victory, for they shall surely go awry as combat commences and descends into chaos…Let us be done with all that, with talk and poses and lies about genius in war.” (p. 579)
I’m a Vietnam veteran. This book changed my concept of the enormity of war. I had to skim the middle parts of the book that reflect a diligent scholar’s tireless recitation of the casualty lists of several millennia of warfare that killed the many, and only barely served the few.
Read more of my book reviews on my website: http://richardsubber.com/
The human nature part is mostly depressing. Nolan’s copiously documented conclusion is that mankind has spilled blood for millennia, praised “noble, decisive” battle, and failed to invent any way of making war that makes sense or is strategically effective.
Nolan says that generals and armies and kings and governments nearly always find ways to lose wars, and hardly ever find ways to win wars.
The “allure of battle” hides the grisly truth: almost without exception, battles don’t win wars. Almost always, one of the combatants finally throws in the towel after losing soldiers, weapons, and wealth, and after suffering the withering economic and social effects of war by attrition.
The winner doesn’t win by noble deeds and glorious victories…the winner “wins” because the loser finally gives up.
One trenchant excerpt:
“…with few exceptions, the major power wars of the past several centuries were in the end decided by grinding exhaustion more than by the operational art of even the greatest of the modern great captains.” (pp. 9-10)
From Nolan’s conclusion in The Allure of Battle:
“First, beware the vanity of nations and the hubris of leaders, civilian and military…There is grave danger to youth forced into uniform by the hurried ambitions of old men who never wore one…Also, from those who did, but who lost the wars of their youth, and grew grim and determined to try again…Second, always be deeply skeptical of short-war plans and promises of easy victory, for they shall surely go awry as combat commences and descends into chaos…Let us be done with all that, with talk and poses and lies about genius in war.” (p. 579)
I’m a Vietnam veteran. This book changed my concept of the enormity of war. I had to skim the middle parts of the book that reflect a diligent scholar’s tireless recitation of the casualty lists of several millennia of warfare that killed the many, and only barely served the few.
Read more of my book reviews on my website: http://richardsubber.com/
July 19, 2019
Most history books look at battles, some examine wars, but Nolan questions the narrative of those battles as decisive to the outcome of war, calling into question much of the modern offensive doctrine. Invaluable questions for those thinking about strategy in major wars.
August 22, 2019
On the surface, the main thesis of Cathal Nolan's The Allure of Battle shouldn't be that earth-shattering - namely, that Great Power conflict is almost never decided by any sort of battlefield brilliance, but by exhaustion of one side's material means and political will to continue. Yet Nolan's long tour of military history demonstrates just how pervasive the pernicious myths of "short, sharp wars," "military genius," "operational art," and the like truly are. Not only did most of the celebrated Great Captains of history - Hannibal, Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon, etc. - end up failing to hold the gains won by their supposed genius for battle, but their nations generally ended up losing decisively. In fact, the greater and their battlefield triumphs, the more complete their eventual defeats as coalitions emerged to balance disruptive victors and resistance from previously overwhelmed adversaries generally grew.
However, Nolan argues persuasively, for a host of reasons (many rooted in Western cultural developments such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Social Darwinism), leaders and countries have succumbed to the allure of the battle, the idea that a great general or operational brilliance could achieve strategic and political objectives against numerically superior adversaries through decisive battlefield victories. Nolan traces the roots of this siren song, and illustrates just how strongly it impacted particularly aggressive or revisionist powers - the France of both Louis XIV and Napoleon; Bismarck's and Moltke's Prussia, the Kaiser's Imperial Germany, Hitler's Germany, and Imperial Japan. The search for battlefield success, whether battles of encirclement, envelopment, or annihilation, drove these powers to downplay or ignore their own weaknesses in materiel or manpower relative to adversaries. The reason? If they acknowledged such weakness, the inevitable conclusion must be that war - especially aggressive war - was not a viable instrument of policy for achieving their political goals. Nolan shows how the grip of this illusion allowed these powers and individuals not only to confidently launch aggressive wars when ignorant of their actual weakness, but even to launch these wars and double-down on past failures with the full knowledge of their likely failure (the doubts of Moltke the Younger and Falkenhayn in 1914 or of Yamamoto and others in Japan in 1941 are particularly stark examples).
The implications from Nolan's work are more profound than the thesis itself. The last sentences of the book quote Indian and Pakistani generals referring to the likely short and violent nature of future conflicts, and their preparedness to wage those conflicts. While he doesn't mention it, the Chinese PLA's emerging doctrine of "short, sharp war" should clearly set off alarm bells.
The other great virtue of this book is Nolan's refreshing bluntness. Military history often is too sympathetic to commanders and leaders who launch wars of aggression or lead their armies and nations to eventual disaster - so long as their battlefield exploits are sufficiently impressive. Nolan pulls no punches. Marlborough, Napoleon, Ludendorff, Hitler and his self-aggrandizing generals who sought to distance themselves from their Fuhrer and the Nazis while claiming credit for short-lived battlefield brilliance, the entire IJN and IJA leadership - all rightly come under withering criticism for their strategically stupid or even nonexistent thinking, no matter how successful on the battlefield. Nolan is also poignant in his descriptions of the terrible slaughter, carnage, and horror wreaked on soldiers and civilians alike by these men.
A couple of small critiques. Nolan explicitly states that he intends the book for a wider audience, so the expository nature of much of the history can be a bit of a slog for readers who already are familiar with the campaigns of Napoleon, Moltke, or Marlborough. The book's chapters and arguments are clearly structured in a "tell them what you're going to tell them; tell them; tell them what you told them" style that perhaps makes the book longer than it needs to be, and can lead to some dead-horse flogging. But these are small issues that Nolan is upfront about in his introduction.
The downside of this greater length is that there is less room to explore a couple of key questions that arise from Nolan's thesis and historical case studies. Firstly, Nolan doesn't give sufficient credit to the bureaucratic dynamics from 19th-century Prussia onwards. Recognizing that aggressive, revisionist war would be virtually impossible to win for Prussia, Imperial Germany, or Japan would create existential crises for the military establishments of these states. Given the centrality of the military establishment in both nations, it is hard to imagine a different path for them to take, given it took the gotterdammerung of WWII in both nations to finally destroy that grip. This may sound a bit too determinative, but bureaucracies and institutions generate a momentum (and inertia) all their own.
The other key question this reader took away from the book concerns the treatment of the primary exception to Nolan's "rule" - the fall of France in 1940. Nolan talks about probabilities and likelihood - obviously a war's outcomes cannot be determined with certainty in advance - but it remains striking. Nolan applauds the overall French and British clearsightedness regarding the nature of the new war against Germany, namely that it would be a long war, that France and Britain should plan to defend and absorb German attacks for up to two years before launching their own offensives once fully mobilized and German forces had been worn down in their own wasteful offensives. Yet despite being more prepared for a long war than Germany, France and Britain were decisively defeated on the battlefield, and France thus collapsed. Nolan argues persuasively - building on the work of May and others - that incredible German luck and more than some Allied military incompetence were key factors in this battlefield disaster, but he does not sufficiently account for the implications of France's complete collapse after this defeat. If Nolan's argument is that battlefield success isn't decisive if the losing nation has the means and will to continue to fight, why did France - which had the means and (according to most revisionist historians) had rebuilt enough popular will to resist - instead collapse and give in? Particularly given how dangerous the enduring "short war" illusion is in today's world, a clearer understanding of why France collapsed and why it became the "exception" would have been useful.
However, these are questions for further discussion, not major flaws in this hugely important book.
However, Nolan argues persuasively, for a host of reasons (many rooted in Western cultural developments such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Social Darwinism), leaders and countries have succumbed to the allure of the battle, the idea that a great general or operational brilliance could achieve strategic and political objectives against numerically superior adversaries through decisive battlefield victories. Nolan traces the roots of this siren song, and illustrates just how strongly it impacted particularly aggressive or revisionist powers - the France of both Louis XIV and Napoleon; Bismarck's and Moltke's Prussia, the Kaiser's Imperial Germany, Hitler's Germany, and Imperial Japan. The search for battlefield success, whether battles of encirclement, envelopment, or annihilation, drove these powers to downplay or ignore their own weaknesses in materiel or manpower relative to adversaries. The reason? If they acknowledged such weakness, the inevitable conclusion must be that war - especially aggressive war - was not a viable instrument of policy for achieving their political goals. Nolan shows how the grip of this illusion allowed these powers and individuals not only to confidently launch aggressive wars when ignorant of their actual weakness, but even to launch these wars and double-down on past failures with the full knowledge of their likely failure (the doubts of Moltke the Younger and Falkenhayn in 1914 or of Yamamoto and others in Japan in 1941 are particularly stark examples).
The implications from Nolan's work are more profound than the thesis itself. The last sentences of the book quote Indian and Pakistani generals referring to the likely short and violent nature of future conflicts, and their preparedness to wage those conflicts. While he doesn't mention it, the Chinese PLA's emerging doctrine of "short, sharp war" should clearly set off alarm bells.
The other great virtue of this book is Nolan's refreshing bluntness. Military history often is too sympathetic to commanders and leaders who launch wars of aggression or lead their armies and nations to eventual disaster - so long as their battlefield exploits are sufficiently impressive. Nolan pulls no punches. Marlborough, Napoleon, Ludendorff, Hitler and his self-aggrandizing generals who sought to distance themselves from their Fuhrer and the Nazis while claiming credit for short-lived battlefield brilliance, the entire IJN and IJA leadership - all rightly come under withering criticism for their strategically stupid or even nonexistent thinking, no matter how successful on the battlefield. Nolan is also poignant in his descriptions of the terrible slaughter, carnage, and horror wreaked on soldiers and civilians alike by these men.
A couple of small critiques. Nolan explicitly states that he intends the book for a wider audience, so the expository nature of much of the history can be a bit of a slog for readers who already are familiar with the campaigns of Napoleon, Moltke, or Marlborough. The book's chapters and arguments are clearly structured in a "tell them what you're going to tell them; tell them; tell them what you told them" style that perhaps makes the book longer than it needs to be, and can lead to some dead-horse flogging. But these are small issues that Nolan is upfront about in his introduction.
The downside of this greater length is that there is less room to explore a couple of key questions that arise from Nolan's thesis and historical case studies. Firstly, Nolan doesn't give sufficient credit to the bureaucratic dynamics from 19th-century Prussia onwards. Recognizing that aggressive, revisionist war would be virtually impossible to win for Prussia, Imperial Germany, or Japan would create existential crises for the military establishments of these states. Given the centrality of the military establishment in both nations, it is hard to imagine a different path for them to take, given it took the gotterdammerung of WWII in both nations to finally destroy that grip. This may sound a bit too determinative, but bureaucracies and institutions generate a momentum (and inertia) all their own.
The other key question this reader took away from the book concerns the treatment of the primary exception to Nolan's "rule" - the fall of France in 1940. Nolan talks about probabilities and likelihood - obviously a war's outcomes cannot be determined with certainty in advance - but it remains striking. Nolan applauds the overall French and British clearsightedness regarding the nature of the new war against Germany, namely that it would be a long war, that France and Britain should plan to defend and absorb German attacks for up to two years before launching their own offensives once fully mobilized and German forces had been worn down in their own wasteful offensives. Yet despite being more prepared for a long war than Germany, France and Britain were decisively defeated on the battlefield, and France thus collapsed. Nolan argues persuasively - building on the work of May and others - that incredible German luck and more than some Allied military incompetence were key factors in this battlefield disaster, but he does not sufficiently account for the implications of France's complete collapse after this defeat. If Nolan's argument is that battlefield success isn't decisive if the losing nation has the means and will to continue to fight, why did France - which had the means and (according to most revisionist historians) had rebuilt enough popular will to resist - instead collapse and give in? Particularly given how dangerous the enduring "short war" illusion is in today's world, a clearer understanding of why France collapsed and why it became the "exception" would have been useful.
However, these are questions for further discussion, not major flaws in this hugely important book.
August 29, 2017
'The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars have been Won and Lost' by Cathal J. Nolan is a book that has captivated me for the last couple months as I read, then put it down to think about it.
The premise is that warfare, as viewed by history and scholars, has glorified specific leaders, like Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte, is flawed thinking. Many of these leaders may have had good ideas, or breakthrough technologies, but often times their victories are not viewed with the true cost. It's one thing to make an academic study, but to make the mistake of short victories is costly. So it trying to mimic other's failures in the hopes of having success.
The book is not anti-war, but it is against the idea of glorification of war. The book covers some ancient war all the way up until the end of World War II. It's primarily European focused, but it's excellently presented, incredibly readable and very thought-provoking. It's the best history book I've read in quite a while.
I received a review copy of this ebook from Oxford University Press and NetGalley in exchange for an honest review. Thank you for allowing me to review this ebook.
The premise is that warfare, as viewed by history and scholars, has glorified specific leaders, like Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte, is flawed thinking. Many of these leaders may have had good ideas, or breakthrough technologies, but often times their victories are not viewed with the true cost. It's one thing to make an academic study, but to make the mistake of short victories is costly. So it trying to mimic other's failures in the hopes of having success.
The book is not anti-war, but it is against the idea of glorification of war. The book covers some ancient war all the way up until the end of World War II. It's primarily European focused, but it's excellently presented, incredibly readable and very thought-provoking. It's the best history book I've read in quite a while.
I received a review copy of this ebook from Oxford University Press and NetGalley in exchange for an honest review. Thank you for allowing me to review this ebook.
July 21, 2019
This book was pretty hard to get through in large part because I kept getting distracted by the author's implications on the nature of warfare and zoning out thinking about it while the audiobook rolled on. Consistently.
I suppose that means this was a pretty good book.
I suppose that means this was a pretty good book.
March 7, 2018
A great big book on a great big subject. Nolan argues that victory in war is misunderstood. Exhaustion is more important than brilliance and the desire to find a Cannae where the enemy is destroyed has led to aggressive pursuit of war that made no sense. It is curious to note that the victors at Cannae, the Carthaginians, were the losers in the war, as the Romans ground them down in Spain and Africa.
September 5, 2018
The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost by Cathal J. Nolan is precisely what it’s subtitle promises. I wouldn’t consider myself a military history enthusiast, so I can’t easily assess Nolan’s presentation of (mostly European) war in the context of his major themes. But Nolan’s history illuminates the ways in which innovation in war has many of the same issues as innovation elsewhere. In particular, knowledge spillovers matter a great deal.
The bulk of Nolan’s book is a history of European warfare. Running through this history are a number of themes. In this review, I thought I would attempt to translate his major themes into a unified model of war. In doing so, I am cramming a more nuanced and subtle presentation of themes into a simplistic theoretical box. Apologies to Nolan.
A Model of War
Suppose war between two parties can be represented as a series of biased coin flips. Heads I win, tails I lose. Each coin flip represents a particular engagement. The “coin flips” of each engagement may be biased, because one side has better tactics, technology, elan vital, etc.
Many engagements might make up a battle, and many battles might make up a war. Losses destroy military resources, and a country can only fight so long as it can supply these resources. In general, bigger countries can supply more resources.
The crucial assumptions of the model are this:
1. Biases rapidly erode, so that before too long both sides have an equal probability of winning an engagement.
2. Countries have different beliefs about the extent and persistence of bias.
The first assumption is a consequence of knowledge diffusion. Superior tactics are observed and copied. Superior technology is liberated from captured foes or stolen via espionage. This is the same problem that bedevils private companies that want to retain the “edge” they get from R&D. Nolan supplies copious examples of the tendency for any one side’s “edge” to become eroded as its best ideas are diffused.
The second assumption is rather banal. It just asserts that nations (or more particularly, their leaders) do not share the same information or beliefs.
These assumptions have two major consequences, which are woven throughout Nolan’s presentation of military history.
War of Attrition
The first major implication is about the length and nature of war. Because the outcomes of engagements are initially biased, if a belligerent has a large enough bias in its favor, it may be able to defeat a larger enemy before it’s bias is eroded. For this to happen, the aggressor would need to develop a substantial military advantage in isolation, to prevent knowledge from diffusing to the enemy. Does this ever happen?
Perhaps it can. Though it is not part of Nolan’s narrative, this can account for the rapidity with which Europe subdued its colonial empires with relatively small military forces. European colonial powers were isolated from their colonies for centuries, developing powerful military technologies and tactics on the battlefields of Europe. Crucially, these developments were isolated from future colonies, allowing a substantial military advantage to accumulate by the time war began. In this case, the bias seems to have been large enough to overwhelm differences in the capacity to deploy military resources.
However, within the theater of Europe itself, the answer appears to be no. Developing a military edge appears to require military engagement to perfect. These engagements, then, become the vehicle for diffusing knowledge about superior tactics and technology. Nolan gives many examples of this kind of “in-war” innovation and learning, ranging from the discovery of how close your infantry had to advance before they could stop and accurately hit entrenched targets, to the discovery that WWII bombers needed to practice large-scale area bombing to destroy military targets because they were so inaccurate.
Except in unusual cases (such as long periods of isolation), the first assumption implies that most wars quickly devolve into a war of attrition, where each side trades losses until the one able to muster fewer military resources capitulates. Yes, there may be lucky and unlucky streaks, but in the end the law of large numbers ensures both sides trade wins and losses on roughly equal terms. Battles are rarely decisive, but merely accelerate or prolong the war of attrition. It is eventually won by the bigger country (or coalition), which can afford to fight for longer. Nolan is fond of quoting Voltaire: “God is always on the side of the big battalions.”
This is a terrible kind of war that few would willingly choose. It is costly, miserable, and long. So why do we nonetheless have war? This is the second implication of this model.
False Beliefs and Much to Gain
The second assumption allows nations to vary in their beliefs. Given that war by attrition is so terrible, wars tend to be started only by countries that incorrectly discount the probability of war by attrition. These are countries that have excessive confidence in the size and durability of the bias in their favor. In this model, war is sort of like the winner’s curse, whereby auctions are won by whichever bidder most overvalues the good for sale. Just so, war is started by whichever country is most mistaken about the scale and durability of its’ advantage.
Nolan calls this “the short-war delusion.” It is a belief that the aggressor’s advantages are so profound that definitive defeats will quickly force the enemy to accept terms. It is a delusion, because this is so rarely the case.
There are some additional and interesting complexities. Frequently, the aggressor really does have an initial advantage over its enemy (which is how the short-war delusion is born). This allows them to have a series of significant early victories, cementing the leading general’s status in the annals of military history. Unfortunately, these early victories prompt the aggressor to increase their confidence that the bias will remain in their favor, leading them to overreach in their ambitions and sustain their war-making effort after the bias has completely eroded. Think of Germany or Napoleon deciding to invade Russia, for example.
Second, war is more likely to be started by countries with more to gain from victory, all else equal. Small nations on the rise, such as Germany or Prussia, enjoy larger proportionate gains in resources from any given victory, and they often tend to be aggressors. Leaders that have a love for war in and of itself are also likely to seek it out (here, Nolan points to Napoleon, Hitler, and the Japanese military in the run-up to WWII).
Lastly, this model implies an endogenous termination of peace. The military does not stand still during peacetime, but continues to develop new technologies and tactics, practiced and developed in secret war games. However, this data is highly imperfect, because perfecting military tactics and technologies can only be done in actual battle. During this period, a lack of good data on how these new technologies and tactics will play out in a real world may allow beliefs to become uncoupled from reality. As beliefs in the extent and persistence of bias diverge from the discipline of actual data, eventually there will be a country that grows overconfident. It will initiate war, secure in the (false) belief that “this time it will be different.” They will win decisively, and avoid a war of attrition. Think here of the long peace, that finally resulted in the cataclysm of World Wars I and II.
Empirical Support
To be clear, this is my interpretation of Nolan’s model, and I have simplified. I’ve probably emphasized the technology spillover part more than he would, given my interests. Anyway, is the model true? The bulk of Nolan’s book is a reasonably comprehensive retelling of the history of European war, meant to provide the empirical support for the model I’ve sketched out above. As noted above, I wouldn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to assess his presentation. But, I plan to keep this framework in the back of my mind the next time I read something in the same genre.
PS
I liked this book a lot, but I'm very stingy with my stars. Think of them as Michelin stars!
Also, this review is cross-posted on medium.com/@mattclancy
The bulk of Nolan’s book is a history of European warfare. Running through this history are a number of themes. In this review, I thought I would attempt to translate his major themes into a unified model of war. In doing so, I am cramming a more nuanced and subtle presentation of themes into a simplistic theoretical box. Apologies to Nolan.
A Model of War
Suppose war between two parties can be represented as a series of biased coin flips. Heads I win, tails I lose. Each coin flip represents a particular engagement. The “coin flips” of each engagement may be biased, because one side has better tactics, technology, elan vital, etc.
Many engagements might make up a battle, and many battles might make up a war. Losses destroy military resources, and a country can only fight so long as it can supply these resources. In general, bigger countries can supply more resources.
The crucial assumptions of the model are this:
1. Biases rapidly erode, so that before too long both sides have an equal probability of winning an engagement.
2. Countries have different beliefs about the extent and persistence of bias.
The first assumption is a consequence of knowledge diffusion. Superior tactics are observed and copied. Superior technology is liberated from captured foes or stolen via espionage. This is the same problem that bedevils private companies that want to retain the “edge” they get from R&D. Nolan supplies copious examples of the tendency for any one side’s “edge” to become eroded as its best ideas are diffused.
The second assumption is rather banal. It just asserts that nations (or more particularly, their leaders) do not share the same information or beliefs.
These assumptions have two major consequences, which are woven throughout Nolan’s presentation of military history.
War of Attrition
The first major implication is about the length and nature of war. Because the outcomes of engagements are initially biased, if a belligerent has a large enough bias in its favor, it may be able to defeat a larger enemy before it’s bias is eroded. For this to happen, the aggressor would need to develop a substantial military advantage in isolation, to prevent knowledge from diffusing to the enemy. Does this ever happen?
Perhaps it can. Though it is not part of Nolan’s narrative, this can account for the rapidity with which Europe subdued its colonial empires with relatively small military forces. European colonial powers were isolated from their colonies for centuries, developing powerful military technologies and tactics on the battlefields of Europe. Crucially, these developments were isolated from future colonies, allowing a substantial military advantage to accumulate by the time war began. In this case, the bias seems to have been large enough to overwhelm differences in the capacity to deploy military resources.
However, within the theater of Europe itself, the answer appears to be no. Developing a military edge appears to require military engagement to perfect. These engagements, then, become the vehicle for diffusing knowledge about superior tactics and technology. Nolan gives many examples of this kind of “in-war” innovation and learning, ranging from the discovery of how close your infantry had to advance before they could stop and accurately hit entrenched targets, to the discovery that WWII bombers needed to practice large-scale area bombing to destroy military targets because they were so inaccurate.
Except in unusual cases (such as long periods of isolation), the first assumption implies that most wars quickly devolve into a war of attrition, where each side trades losses until the one able to muster fewer military resources capitulates. Yes, there may be lucky and unlucky streaks, but in the end the law of large numbers ensures both sides trade wins and losses on roughly equal terms. Battles are rarely decisive, but merely accelerate or prolong the war of attrition. It is eventually won by the bigger country (or coalition), which can afford to fight for longer. Nolan is fond of quoting Voltaire: “God is always on the side of the big battalions.”
This is a terrible kind of war that few would willingly choose. It is costly, miserable, and long. So why do we nonetheless have war? This is the second implication of this model.
False Beliefs and Much to Gain
The second assumption allows nations to vary in their beliefs. Given that war by attrition is so terrible, wars tend to be started only by countries that incorrectly discount the probability of war by attrition. These are countries that have excessive confidence in the size and durability of the bias in their favor. In this model, war is sort of like the winner’s curse, whereby auctions are won by whichever bidder most overvalues the good for sale. Just so, war is started by whichever country is most mistaken about the scale and durability of its’ advantage.
Nolan calls this “the short-war delusion.” It is a belief that the aggressor’s advantages are so profound that definitive defeats will quickly force the enemy to accept terms. It is a delusion, because this is so rarely the case.
There are some additional and interesting complexities. Frequently, the aggressor really does have an initial advantage over its enemy (which is how the short-war delusion is born). This allows them to have a series of significant early victories, cementing the leading general’s status in the annals of military history. Unfortunately, these early victories prompt the aggressor to increase their confidence that the bias will remain in their favor, leading them to overreach in their ambitions and sustain their war-making effort after the bias has completely eroded. Think of Germany or Napoleon deciding to invade Russia, for example.
Second, war is more likely to be started by countries with more to gain from victory, all else equal. Small nations on the rise, such as Germany or Prussia, enjoy larger proportionate gains in resources from any given victory, and they often tend to be aggressors. Leaders that have a love for war in and of itself are also likely to seek it out (here, Nolan points to Napoleon, Hitler, and the Japanese military in the run-up to WWII).
Lastly, this model implies an endogenous termination of peace. The military does not stand still during peacetime, but continues to develop new technologies and tactics, practiced and developed in secret war games. However, this data is highly imperfect, because perfecting military tactics and technologies can only be done in actual battle. During this period, a lack of good data on how these new technologies and tactics will play out in a real world may allow beliefs to become uncoupled from reality. As beliefs in the extent and persistence of bias diverge from the discipline of actual data, eventually there will be a country that grows overconfident. It will initiate war, secure in the (false) belief that “this time it will be different.” They will win decisively, and avoid a war of attrition. Think here of the long peace, that finally resulted in the cataclysm of World Wars I and II.
Empirical Support
To be clear, this is my interpretation of Nolan’s model, and I have simplified. I’ve probably emphasized the technology spillover part more than he would, given my interests. Anyway, is the model true? The bulk of Nolan’s book is a reasonably comprehensive retelling of the history of European war, meant to provide the empirical support for the model I’ve sketched out above. As noted above, I wouldn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to assess his presentation. But, I plan to keep this framework in the back of my mind the next time I read something in the same genre.
PS
I liked this book a lot, but I'm very stingy with my stars. Think of them as Michelin stars!
Also, this review is cross-posted on medium.com/@mattclancy
March 17, 2017
Are you looking for a military history examining how the idea of "decisive battle" has shaped politicians, military commanders, and scholars actions and writings. Cathal Nolan provides just such a history in The Allure of Battle.
Nolan opens The Allure of Battle with a defense of military history in general and the role of battles as specific events in his introduction. He then, in Chapter 1, sets the role of battle, especially the concept of "decisive battle" in a historical context. He also discusses how scholars and humanists portrayed the role of battle versus what the historical record shows regarding the role of battle. Chapters 2 to 16 provide a summary of the role of battle in various historical periods beginning with the Hundred Years War and ending with World War II. Some chapters provide more details of particular battles/campaigns than others, but all the chapters have enough detail for a general reader to follow Nolan's arguments on how battles influenced the winning of wars.
The Allure of Battle is a sweeping look at battle in a historical setting and the number of pages in the book provides Nolan enough depth to flesh out his argument and give details to support it. The coverage of lesser known campaigns/wars such at the Seven Years War or the campaigns of Louis 14 of France and the Duke of Marlborough provides insight often given short shift in standard military histories. Unfortunately, Nolan does not include the English Civil War, the American Civil War, and non-European wars/campaigns/battles that do not include a European combatant. However, the reader of military history will find much to ponder in Nolan's The Allure of Battle.
Nolan opens The Allure of Battle with a defense of military history in general and the role of battles as specific events in his introduction. He then, in Chapter 1, sets the role of battle, especially the concept of "decisive battle" in a historical context. He also discusses how scholars and humanists portrayed the role of battle versus what the historical record shows regarding the role of battle. Chapters 2 to 16 provide a summary of the role of battle in various historical periods beginning with the Hundred Years War and ending with World War II. Some chapters provide more details of particular battles/campaigns than others, but all the chapters have enough detail for a general reader to follow Nolan's arguments on how battles influenced the winning of wars.
The Allure of Battle is a sweeping look at battle in a historical setting and the number of pages in the book provides Nolan enough depth to flesh out his argument and give details to support it. The coverage of lesser known campaigns/wars such at the Seven Years War or the campaigns of Louis 14 of France and the Duke of Marlborough provides insight often given short shift in standard military histories. Unfortunately, Nolan does not include the English Civil War, the American Civil War, and non-European wars/campaigns/battles that do not include a European combatant. However, the reader of military history will find much to ponder in Nolan's The Allure of Battle.
October 20, 2019
Exhaustively researched but desperately in need of an editor, this book poses an interesting but fundamentally incomplete argument against decisive battles as the framework for a successful war. In place of these poorly defined battles, the author posits equally poorly defined attrition as the most significant factor. The thesis is, I think, valid but this book needs to be much tighter to make the argument stick.
May 27, 2017
Magisterial
February 4, 2018
Should be read by everyone interested in military history
Read
October 8, 2020The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost by Cathal Nolan is the study of the history of warfare an attempt to determine what is the cause the final outcome. Nolan is Associate Professor of History and Executive Director of the International History Institute, Boston University. He is an award-winning teacher and scholar of military and international history. He earned his MA (History) and Ph.D. (International History and International Relations) from the University of Toronto.
The history of man is a history of wars. History is punctuated wars of all kinds from the beginning of recorded history to the present. Nolan takes the reader from Greek and Roman times through WWII. Empires fought wars from Greek times to the fall of Constantinople. The Middle Ages was also filled with wars between property holders and those wanting their "stuff". The Middle Ages saw a change in warfare as empires were scarce and nation states have not yet risen. It was a time of mercenaries, whose loyalty was bought and sold for gold. Your mercenaries today might be your enemy’s mercenaries tomorrow.
Mercenary warfare was not the best choice to conduct wars. Wars in the Italian states fought with mercenaries brought serious concerns in the politically unstable region. Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli was one of the first to support the idea of citizen militias. Not only was loyalty assured, but citizens were willing to fight in their interests which might not be the same an ambitious ruler. Loyalty and moderation would go a long way in creating stability.
Technology seems to play the biggest roles in battles. Late medieval fortification design worked to end the supremacy of gunpowder cannons while at the same time creating overlapping fields of fire for the defenders. There was a growth in defensive warfare. Fortifications and overlapping fields of fire could hold off a very powerful adversary. What offensive nations aspired for was a quick victory. No nation intends to enter a long war. Even in modern times, the US invasion of Iraq was going to be a quick war with little resistance. As the years dragged on the popularity for the war declined rapidly.
WWI was intended to be a very quick war by both sides. The nations involved did not think they could survive a long war. It would be a disruption in the (growing) economy and trade. The war that started in August 1914 was expected to be over by that Christmas. Nations did not know how to adapt to the new technologies especially the machine gun. The war turned defensive quickly with a line of trenches from the Channel to the Swiss borders. Generals looking for that decisive battle that would turn the war in their favor sent wave after wave of men to their deaths without any results. Unwilling to learn from their mistakes the generals kept at the same tactics. Hitler, a participant in the defensive war, decided not to make that mistake when he launched his initially successful invasions.
Nolan looks at the history of mostly Western warfare and examines famous battles and examines if these battles were turning points in wars and why some highly successful battles had little effect on the outcome of the war. We tend to think of battles as turning points in wars from Saratoga to raising the flag at Iwo Jima. But for every turning point battle, there are plenty of battles of the Marne or Operation Barbarossa where Germany captured 600,000 prisoners and advanced 200 miles in one week only to go down in defeat. Nolan’s examination of battles shows the failure of a major battlefield success to clinch an overall victory in the war. An outstanding history and examination of war.
The history of man is a history of wars. History is punctuated wars of all kinds from the beginning of recorded history to the present. Nolan takes the reader from Greek and Roman times through WWII. Empires fought wars from Greek times to the fall of Constantinople. The Middle Ages was also filled with wars between property holders and those wanting their "stuff". The Middle Ages saw a change in warfare as empires were scarce and nation states have not yet risen. It was a time of mercenaries, whose loyalty was bought and sold for gold. Your mercenaries today might be your enemy’s mercenaries tomorrow.
Mercenary warfare was not the best choice to conduct wars. Wars in the Italian states fought with mercenaries brought serious concerns in the politically unstable region. Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli was one of the first to support the idea of citizen militias. Not only was loyalty assured, but citizens were willing to fight in their interests which might not be the same an ambitious ruler. Loyalty and moderation would go a long way in creating stability.
Technology seems to play the biggest roles in battles. Late medieval fortification design worked to end the supremacy of gunpowder cannons while at the same time creating overlapping fields of fire for the defenders. There was a growth in defensive warfare. Fortifications and overlapping fields of fire could hold off a very powerful adversary. What offensive nations aspired for was a quick victory. No nation intends to enter a long war. Even in modern times, the US invasion of Iraq was going to be a quick war with little resistance. As the years dragged on the popularity for the war declined rapidly.
WWI was intended to be a very quick war by both sides. The nations involved did not think they could survive a long war. It would be a disruption in the (growing) economy and trade. The war that started in August 1914 was expected to be over by that Christmas. Nations did not know how to adapt to the new technologies especially the machine gun. The war turned defensive quickly with a line of trenches from the Channel to the Swiss borders. Generals looking for that decisive battle that would turn the war in their favor sent wave after wave of men to their deaths without any results. Unwilling to learn from their mistakes the generals kept at the same tactics. Hitler, a participant in the defensive war, decided not to make that mistake when he launched his initially successful invasions.
Nolan looks at the history of mostly Western warfare and examines famous battles and examines if these battles were turning points in wars and why some highly successful battles had little effect on the outcome of the war. We tend to think of battles as turning points in wars from Saratoga to raising the flag at Iwo Jima. But for every turning point battle, there are plenty of battles of the Marne or Operation Barbarossa where Germany captured 600,000 prisoners and advanced 200 miles in one week only to go down in defeat. Nolan’s examination of battles shows the failure of a major battlefield success to clinch an overall victory in the war. An outstanding history and examination of war.
August 30, 2021
The importance of battle suffuses military history like nothing else: names like Cannae, Leuthen, Ulm, Gettysburg, Normandy all evoke a culmination of men and materiel that decide the lives of men, nations, empires and civilizations. What if the notion that battles mean everything was wrong, though? Cathal Nolan explores that question in plodding but engrossing detail in his Europe-centric "The Allure of Battle." From Greek and Roman times to the Second World War, Nolan sets out to de-bunk the myth of great battles and genius military leaders, and instead pose a somewhat obvious but still groundbreaking idea: materiel, economics, and societal infrastructure dictates who wins wars more than singular battlefield victories.
For readers of military history, Nolan's book reads like a massive de-bunking of long-cherished heroes. Hannibal, Marlborough, Napoleon, Moltke (the Younger) and Hitler are thoroughly critiqued for focusing upon short-term battlefield success at the expense of long-term, attritional strategy. Nolan's review of Napoleon is particularly fascinating: though a tactical wunderkind in some respects, Napoleon, in Nolan's telling, benefits from the French Revolution's watershed innovation the levee en masse. By stuffing armies with peasants, rather than professionals, France came to dominate and overwhelm its enemies and neighbors. Napoleon built upon the peoples' army concept, though could never separate lust for battle from strategic, long-term victory. The disastrous retreat from Moscow highlights just how much of a gamble battle is, and how often the supposed iron dice roll up with snake eyes, even for geniuses.
Nolan's book teases out the allure of short-term battlefield victory, most prominent in the war-planning on the German side prior to the First World War. German generals understood that the German Empire stood small against Britain, France and Russia arrayed against it. Rather than hew to diplomacy and domestic growth, though, German generals (wrongly) hearkened back to the country's wars in the 1870s, seeking quick, decisive victory. Like generals of every generation, Germany's military brass in 1914 expected a short, glorious, and victorious war; instead, its military might melted away in the mud, muck and misery of Northern France, Belgium, Galicia and Italy. If nothing else, Nolan's book yells out to current and future generations: beware the promises of short war, easy victory, and a decisive battle.
Nolan's "The Allure of Battle" is focused intently upon European military history, though some 20th Century East Asian history is brought to light via the Japanese Empire's colonial adventures. The book is imposing in its depth and details, but retains a narrative spark and occasional focus on just how awful wars and battles are for humans to keep the reader attuned. The lack of focus on insurgency wars (Malaya; Iraq; Afghanistan) and American wars (particularly the Civil War) is not a weakness so much as a wish to hear the author's take.
In sum, it is a monumental book that seeks to de-monumentalize battle. For that insight, Nolan's book cannot be more commendable to those wishing to understand how wars end.
For readers of military history, Nolan's book reads like a massive de-bunking of long-cherished heroes. Hannibal, Marlborough, Napoleon, Moltke (the Younger) and Hitler are thoroughly critiqued for focusing upon short-term battlefield success at the expense of long-term, attritional strategy. Nolan's review of Napoleon is particularly fascinating: though a tactical wunderkind in some respects, Napoleon, in Nolan's telling, benefits from the French Revolution's watershed innovation the levee en masse. By stuffing armies with peasants, rather than professionals, France came to dominate and overwhelm its enemies and neighbors. Napoleon built upon the peoples' army concept, though could never separate lust for battle from strategic, long-term victory. The disastrous retreat from Moscow highlights just how much of a gamble battle is, and how often the supposed iron dice roll up with snake eyes, even for geniuses.
Nolan's book teases out the allure of short-term battlefield victory, most prominent in the war-planning on the German side prior to the First World War. German generals understood that the German Empire stood small against Britain, France and Russia arrayed against it. Rather than hew to diplomacy and domestic growth, though, German generals (wrongly) hearkened back to the country's wars in the 1870s, seeking quick, decisive victory. Like generals of every generation, Germany's military brass in 1914 expected a short, glorious, and victorious war; instead, its military might melted away in the mud, muck and misery of Northern France, Belgium, Galicia and Italy. If nothing else, Nolan's book yells out to current and future generations: beware the promises of short war, easy victory, and a decisive battle.
Nolan's "The Allure of Battle" is focused intently upon European military history, though some 20th Century East Asian history is brought to light via the Japanese Empire's colonial adventures. The book is imposing in its depth and details, but retains a narrative spark and occasional focus on just how awful wars and battles are for humans to keep the reader attuned. The lack of focus on insurgency wars (Malaya; Iraq; Afghanistan) and American wars (particularly the Civil War) is not a weakness so much as a wish to hear the author's take.
In sum, it is a monumental book that seeks to de-monumentalize battle. For that insight, Nolan's book cannot be more commendable to those wishing to understand how wars end.
October 17, 2020
Interesting book, interesting concept, starting from the basic idea that military planners and their civilian leaders often plan to seek decision through battle, and that has rarely occurred. From the 30 years war to World War II, most major wars have been decided through attrition, devastation, and exhaustion rather than decisive battle. The exceptions to this rule are less decisive than originally thought and generally led to the formation of countervailing pressures. It is a great read for mid-to-late career military professionals and military history buffs.
The book is a good critical historical survey of major wars in the modern era and the role of attrition in bringing about their final outcome. It is excellent at pointing out how the notion of a short and decisive war by the aggressor led to eventual strategic defeat, and describing how logistic, operational, and strategic factors combined to prevent decision through battle. It takes a critical look at some of the great generals of history - Marlborough, Nassau, Adolphus Gustavus, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, von Moltke - and critiques how historical focus on their genius masks the grave operational and strategic mistakes they made. It ultimately concludes with a persuasive argument of how the "short war delusion," especially as held by the aggressors, led directly to the disasters of World War I, World War II in Europe, and World War II in the Pacific.
Ultimately, this book is better read as a critique of military history and strategy, not as a stand-alone history. If you don't already know what Jena-Auerstadt, Borodino, Sedan, or Brest-Litovsk refer to you may want to read a more general history of European wars first. It is most useful if you're familiar with the more standard "Clausewitzian" arguments - that battle decides war, and that genius in the commander can decide battles - and the history of major wars written from that perspective. For me, since I recently attended several years of advanced military schools asserting the more 'standard' argument, it is an EXTREMELY useful book and provoked a lot of thought.
Overall, I think this book is VERY useful for military planners, especially US military field grade officers who have attended SAMS/SASS/JAWS or intermediate level education. It's a great critique of some of the curriculum there. It's also good for people who have a general interest in military history. If you're reading it for insights into current military policy you'll be disappointed or draw the wrong conclusions.
The book is a good critical historical survey of major wars in the modern era and the role of attrition in bringing about their final outcome. It is excellent at pointing out how the notion of a short and decisive war by the aggressor led to eventual strategic defeat, and describing how logistic, operational, and strategic factors combined to prevent decision through battle. It takes a critical look at some of the great generals of history - Marlborough, Nassau, Adolphus Gustavus, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, von Moltke - and critiques how historical focus on their genius masks the grave operational and strategic mistakes they made. It ultimately concludes with a persuasive argument of how the "short war delusion," especially as held by the aggressors, led directly to the disasters of World War I, World War II in Europe, and World War II in the Pacific.
Ultimately, this book is better read as a critique of military history and strategy, not as a stand-alone history. If you don't already know what Jena-Auerstadt, Borodino, Sedan, or Brest-Litovsk refer to you may want to read a more general history of European wars first. It is most useful if you're familiar with the more standard "Clausewitzian" arguments - that battle decides war, and that genius in the commander can decide battles - and the history of major wars written from that perspective. For me, since I recently attended several years of advanced military schools asserting the more 'standard' argument, it is an EXTREMELY useful book and provoked a lot of thought.
Overall, I think this book is VERY useful for military planners, especially US military field grade officers who have attended SAMS/SASS/JAWS or intermediate level education. It's a great critique of some of the curriculum there. It's also good for people who have a general interest in military history. If you're reading it for insights into current military policy you'll be disappointed or draw the wrong conclusions.
April 8, 2022
This is the second book I found while reading through the endnotes and footnotes of another book and student paper.
This book is 582 reading pages - 16 chapters and a conclusion. The author has provided a few nuggets of reference information worth retaining. The notes section is extensive but is degraded by the cynical, snide and sarcastic comments that he includes while referencing a primary or secondary source.
The scope and intended audience of this book is lost in the introduction. Buried in the back is the small statement that military historians are not the intended audience. Rightly so, as the scope, sweep and material is not well presented. it is either too short and crisp which assumes the reader is well knowledgeable, or it is redundant and filled with snide comments. In any case if the intended audience is everyone else except military historians then those readers will get a cynical impression and will lose the importance of the integration of the military, economic, social and political elements that wrought the conflict.
Lastly, the author infers that the allure of battle is focused on the tactical battle yet the presentation of the material, especially the Napoleonic and First World War, goes beyond the intended scope stated in his introduction. I gave this book three stars for several reasons. 1. the notes section deserves 4 stars if you can overlook the injected remarks. 2. The chapters are somewhat redundant, and the writing is too short and crisp for the audience this author claims to write for. 3. The larger historical themes and important information are lost in the writing style- the reader will most likely set this book down before finishing the first chapter. I struggled finishing this book because I was disgusted with the writing style and presentation. I would not allow my children to take any history classes from this author - the presentation is clearly biased.
As a military historian and former Adjunct of History, I agree with the author that military historians are given short shrift, and many historians and students overlook, or ignore its importance. I also agree that war and conflict is far too important to be left to the banality that war serves no purpose and is meaningless. Good luck reader - this is a tough read.
March 3, 2019
I read this book after seeing a review in the Wall Street Journal. I thought it was outstanding. I'm sure each of the great Captains that he covered warrant their own review, but from someone unfamiliar with the history of military tactics/evolution, but interested in them, this book was first rate! I've always wondered how Sweden became a Great Power for a time - it was Gustav II Adolphus. I had never actually heard of the Duke of Marlborough or Gustaf Mauritz. Of course, everybody knows about Napolean, but who has ever heard of Helmuth von Moltke? And those Swiss armies! Undefeated for 200 years until the arrival of firepower.
As time progresses, I'm sure I'll tried to read about each great general in more detail. Having read Nolan, I will know that none of the Captains are as great as their biographers make them out to be. Brilliance is more often luck, and when genius is present for a battle, it is often not combined with long term strategy (e.g., Hannibal at Cannae).
I also thought he was clever in making his points. "And so another generation forgot about war, and thought they would like to try it to." And that is all he offers about the future. Although nuclear weapons appear to have made war between great powers unlikely, a generation in the future might decide they want to try it to.
As time progresses, I'm sure I'll tried to read about each great general in more detail. Having read Nolan, I will know that none of the Captains are as great as their biographers make them out to be. Brilliance is more often luck, and when genius is present for a battle, it is often not combined with long term strategy (e.g., Hannibal at Cannae).
I also thought he was clever in making his points. "And so another generation forgot about war, and thought they would like to try it to." And that is all he offers about the future. Although nuclear weapons appear to have made war between great powers unlikely, a generation in the future might decide they want to try it to.
September 1, 2020
Cathay J. Nolan has written a very interesting and compelling study and examination of how wars have been won and lost since Greek times to the present.What makes this an interesting book for those interested in military history and its impacts across all aspects across civilization, including religion, politics and cultural assumptions, is his ability to link a series of ideas and themes together in a coherent manner.
This is a challenging book to read because of the complexity of the cross-currents that the author brings to bear chronology on the evolution of warfare, however, it is well worth pursuing. One of the great benefits of this book is the author’s bibliography which itself is a course for finding military references and political histories from other authors, bringing their own views, opinions, and wisdom to bear upon the subject.
I found the best way to read this book was a chapter at a time and then reflect upon what I had learned that I did not know, and think about the implications and applications of the big ideas the author talks about that have not changed very much over the last thousand years in terms of their impact upon society.
This is a book that you cannot be in a hurry to read because it is thought provoking and does make you step back and think about your own experiences, opinions, biases and prejudices.
This is a challenging book to read because of the complexity of the cross-currents that the author brings to bear chronology on the evolution of warfare, however, it is well worth pursuing. One of the great benefits of this book is the author’s bibliography which itself is a course for finding military references and political histories from other authors, bringing their own views, opinions, and wisdom to bear upon the subject.
I found the best way to read this book was a chapter at a time and then reflect upon what I had learned that I did not know, and think about the implications and applications of the big ideas the author talks about that have not changed very much over the last thousand years in terms of their impact upon society.
This is a book that you cannot be in a hurry to read because it is thought provoking and does make you step back and think about your own experiences, opinions, biases and prejudices.
March 25, 2021
Fantastic listen for a gritty meditation on the reality of history.
This was one of the strongest history books I read last year. The depth of research was quite good, the author was very fluent in the annals of warfare. I learned a few new things about military technology through history, although the author was more focused on stand-out groups of mercenaries, and politics behind those innovations.
Flow of the thesis was also memorable. It wasn't a strongly controversial thesis, and leaned more academic than outsider/contrarian. There were many counter-examples addressed in great detail by the author, again, mostly a result of military innovation of some sort. The end result of the counter-examples was that the adversaries tend to quickly adopt whatever innovation first allowed the breakout, as the conflict drags on into protracted conflict. The book was fairly tightly structured on the thesis. It went a great deal into storytelling of the specifics, but you could always kind of tell how it was arching back to the main point.
I didn't personally care too much that the author defended his point. I never felt tempted to disagree with it, and it is presented with so much nuance and research that there was never an argument or controversy. I just came for the history. And technology. In these respects, it was a good audiobook listen.
This was one of the strongest history books I read last year. The depth of research was quite good, the author was very fluent in the annals of warfare. I learned a few new things about military technology through history, although the author was more focused on stand-out groups of mercenaries, and politics behind those innovations.
Flow of the thesis was also memorable. It wasn't a strongly controversial thesis, and leaned more academic than outsider/contrarian. There were many counter-examples addressed in great detail by the author, again, mostly a result of military innovation of some sort. The end result of the counter-examples was that the adversaries tend to quickly adopt whatever innovation first allowed the breakout, as the conflict drags on into protracted conflict. The book was fairly tightly structured on the thesis. It went a great deal into storytelling of the specifics, but you could always kind of tell how it was arching back to the main point.
I didn't personally care too much that the author defended his point. I never felt tempted to disagree with it, and it is presented with so much nuance and research that there was never an argument or controversy. I just came for the history. And technology. In these respects, it was a good audiobook listen.
December 25, 2018
Cathal Nolan’s “The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost” is a brilliant read on why we do not learn the right lessons from wars in the past. He explains how tying the ideas of decisive battle and glorious campaigns to the shifting ambitions of political and military leadership to pursue their interest lead to short war fantasies that never come true. When you open Pandora’s box, war seems to have a mind of its own, enemies have a vote and the military doesn’t deliver what it was supposed to. Nolan reviews – mostly western - wars from the fifteenth century up to and including the Second World War to make his point. The chapters on the Dutch war of independence is just great; the same for the way he describes German operational art in “Fall Gelb”: how the Germans defeated the Dutch, Belgium, British and French forces only to lose the war... Nolan blends his historical knowledge on strategy, operational art, tactics and innovation to warn us to be aware of the vanity of nations, its leaders and especially is population, and that we should be very skeptical of short-war plans and promises of easy victory. For 2019, I wish this book is well read and understood in Eastern Europe and across the Atlantic, and that we keep things peacefuly….
June 21, 2022
One of my new favorite books. This well-researched book strips away the romantic notion of the confrontational "decisive battle" is mostly far-fetched and throughout history has shown that many such battles were either of little importance to the overall political tectonics of the ages, or lacked any specific direction to sustain success.
Interestingly enough, he also shows that the dawn of secular humanism brought about a degree of precision and "science" to the art of war that was not present in the religious wars of generations past. He argues that once man professionalized warfare into a cold and calculated profession that separated religious beliefs of the value of human life amongst its fighters, and instilled the concept that the state almighty was the greatest good, that few inhibitions were left in warfare once such revolutionary fervor of the French Revolution, Crimean War, and other "small wars".
Any military professional, or even a worker within government, needs to read this book and understand the responsibility to ensure military objectives and operations are strictly tied to political goals of a country's foreign policy. Once a country's emotions are unleashed in warfare, it risks the population being thrown into oblivion.
Outstanding book.
Interestingly enough, he also shows that the dawn of secular humanism brought about a degree of precision and "science" to the art of war that was not present in the religious wars of generations past. He argues that once man professionalized warfare into a cold and calculated profession that separated religious beliefs of the value of human life amongst its fighters, and instilled the concept that the state almighty was the greatest good, that few inhibitions were left in warfare once such revolutionary fervor of the French Revolution, Crimean War, and other "small wars".
Any military professional, or even a worker within government, needs to read this book and understand the responsibility to ensure military objectives and operations are strictly tied to political goals of a country's foreign policy. Once a country's emotions are unleashed in warfare, it risks the population being thrown into oblivion.
Outstanding book.
October 12, 2021
A great book, presenting an argument that strategic victories cannot be decided by decisive battle but are instead determined through the long term results of attrition. The author, historian Cathal J. Nolan, provides a lengthy historical narrative demonstrating that military genius is truly rare and that decisive battles may exist tactically but are of little consequence in determining a war’s outcome. Through a tour de force of post-medieval European military history, Nolan gives example after example of famous commanders and supposedly decisive battles having little effect on the immediate outcome of wars. It is only through emotional hindsight that these battles are understood as decisive. Nolan shows that maneuver warfare tenets play little role in strategic outcomes. Much more important is the ability of a state to attrite the war making ability of its adversary. The theory is only argued with examples from western military history; it would have been nice to have seen Asian or African military examples supporting the thesis. Highly recommended as a counter-argument to the quick victory theories advertised by decisive battle proponents.
January 21, 2024
[Audiobook] This came recommended from the War on The Rocks Podcast so I had high hopes. The book is overall worthwhile but the middle half doesn’t really add much in my opinion. If it was just the introduction/thesis, the WW1 and WW2 chapters, and the conclusion, this would be a 5 star book for sure.
I recognize this sounds like I’m falling victim to recency bias for WW1&2, but the middle half just reads like a dry history textbook with little tie-in to his thesis.
The thesis is that we (humans) continually fall for the allure of a short and decisive battle to quickly end wars so we “can be home by Christmas.” History has shown this to be overwhelmingly false and short wars are the exception and that no battle has ever really been “decisive” to the war.
I would consider this book essential reading for military officers. I recommend you listen to the introduction/thesis, the WW1 and WW2 chapters, and the conclusion, then revisit the whole book at a later point after you’ve had some time to let it sit in your subconscious.
I recognize this sounds like I’m falling victim to recency bias for WW1&2, but the middle half just reads like a dry history textbook with little tie-in to his thesis.
The thesis is that we (humans) continually fall for the allure of a short and decisive battle to quickly end wars so we “can be home by Christmas.” History has shown this to be overwhelmingly false and short wars are the exception and that no battle has ever really been “decisive” to the war.
I would consider this book essential reading for military officers. I recommend you listen to the introduction/thesis, the WW1 and WW2 chapters, and the conclusion, then revisit the whole book at a later point after you’ve had some time to let it sit in your subconscious.
April 26, 2021
The Allure of Battle catalogues the history of Western war from ancient times to WW2, explaining how politicians and military planners fall into “short war thinking” despite the likelihood of long attritional campaigns.
The chronological approach Nolan uses worked really well, showing how earlier wars influenced later planners. The influence of Prussian military culture and the war of German reunification in 1870 on the world wars is sometimes obscured looking backwards at them as we do. The holistic approach gave a fresh perspective and highlighted just how much chance plays a role in war.
I felt the narrative dragged a little in places, particularly toward the end of the book. Switching away from Europe to Japan in the final two chapters meant that Japanese military culture could not be covered in the same level of depth, which detracted from the book.
The chronological approach Nolan uses worked really well, showing how earlier wars influenced later planners. The influence of Prussian military culture and the war of German reunification in 1870 on the world wars is sometimes obscured looking backwards at them as we do. The holistic approach gave a fresh perspective and highlighted just how much chance plays a role in war.
I felt the narrative dragged a little in places, particularly toward the end of the book. Switching away from Europe to Japan in the final two chapters meant that Japanese military culture could not be covered in the same level of depth, which detracted from the book.
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