When should I trust my gut? Linking domain expertise to intuitive decision-making effectiveness

Abstract

Despite a growing body of scholarship on the concept of intuition, there is a scarcity of empirical research spotlighting the circumstances in which intuitive decision making is effective relative to analytical decision making. Seeking to address this deficiency, we conducted two laboratory studies assessing the link between domain expertise (low versus high) and intuitive decision-making effectiveness. These studies involved non-decomposable tasks across divergent expertise domains: basketball in Study 1 and designer handbag authentication in Study 2. Across both studies, and consistent with our overarching hypothesis, we found that the effectiveness of intuition relative to analysis is amplified at a high level of domain expertise. Taken together, our results demonstrate the importance of domain expertise in intuitive decision making and carry a number of theoretical and practical implications.

Introduction

Emerging research has revived discussions surrounding the effectiveness of intuitive decision making. Traditionally, scholars have viewed intuitions as frequently biased and thus risky to base decisions upon (Dawes et al., 1989, Kahneman et al., 1982, Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Therefore, analytical decision making, which is typically viewed as less susceptible to bias than intuition, has long been promoted by decision-making researchers (e.g., Janis and Mann, 1977, Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). Recently, however, interest in the benefits of intuition has been kindled by research and writings on the “intelligence” of nonconscious thought (George, 2009, Hofmann and Wilson, 2010), the potential accuracy of “thin-slice” judgments (Albrechtsen et al., 2009, Ambady, 2010, Ames et al., 2010), and the conditions under which “fast and frugal” heuristics foster effective decision making (Gigerenzer, 2007, Gigerenzer, 2008, Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).

Through the lines of research noted above, scholars have developed a richer understanding of the nature of intuition and have offered suggestions for when intuition should be enlisted in decision making (e.g., Betsch, 2008, Dane and Pratt, 2007, Epstein, 2010, Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011, Hodgkinson et al., 2008, Hogarth, 2010, Sinclair, 2011). This growing interest in the topic of intuition is particularly evident in organizational scholarship. In today’s organizations there is increasing pressure across many ranks of workers to make decisions that are both rapid and effective (Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002). Doing so can prove challenging, however, because decision speed and decision effectiveness are often thought to be at odds (see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011 for a critique of this position). Intuition has been identified as a potential means by which to circumvent this apparent trade-off (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Indeed, some researchers argue that intuition represents a singular route toward making rapid decisions that are also effective (Hogarth, 2001, Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004).

These advances notwithstanding, empirical research on intuition remains limited. While it is argued that, in certain circumstances, there is merit to employing an intuitive decision-making approach (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003, Kahneman and Klein, 2009, Shapiro and Spence, 1997), there persists a lack of understanding and consensus about what these circumstances are. One possibility is that intuition tends to be effective on certain types of tasks (Hammond et al., 1987, Inbar et al., 2010, McMackin and Slovic, 2000). For example, research suggests that tasks which can be decomposed and approached sequentially tend to be conducive to analytical decision making, whereas tasks that are relatively non-decomposable are more suited to intuition (Hammond et al., 1987). However, the mere presence of a non-decomposable task may not ensure intuitive decision-making effectiveness. Research suggests that even for tasks well-suited to intuition, the effectiveness of intuitive decision making may relate to the level of expertise one has attained in the focal domain (Kahneman and Klein, 2009, Salas et al., 2010). Unfortunately, scant empirical research has directly investigated the connection between domain expertise and intuitive decision making effectiveness on these types of tasks. Seeking to address this deficiency, we examine here how domain expertise relates to intuitive (versus analytical) decision-making effectiveness on non-decomposable tasks across multiple expertise domains.