Icw patronage-and-land-use-study-english

Menguras Bumi
Merebut KursiPatronase Politik-Bisnis Alih Fungsi Lahan:
Studi Kasus & Rekomendasi Kebijakan

Policy Paper
Exhausting the Earth, Snatching the Chair
Politic-Business Patron Practice in Land Conversion: A Case Study
and Policy Recommendation
Almas Sjarina, J. Danang Widoyoko dan Lais Abid1
Introduction
The Indonesian government set an ambitious target of reducing emission up to 26%
in 2020 within their own efforts, and up to 41% with international support. It is not easy to
achieve this ambitious target, particularly because forest conversion to non-forest purposes
continues albeit the application of tighter requirements and longer procedures. One of the
reasons is the increase in the price of mining and plantation products, especially oil palm
and coal.
On the other hand, land conversion issue is related to the interests of political elites
in local level. Democracy in Indonesia could be categorized as patronage democracy
(Webber 2006) and several studies described how local politics is conducted through
patronage relation, particularly between politicians and entrepreneurs2
. The concepts used
to describe the patronage relation include patron-client relation (Scott 1972) and
clienteleism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Patronage relation in this study is defined as the
relation between individuals who assume political positions with individuals who have
wealth and business interests, in which the entrepreneurs provide financial supports to
political officials in order to use their authority and influences for facilitating the
entrepreneurs’ legal or illegal business activities. The dynamics may be related to the lack of
government’s subsidy to the political parties.
Several literature shows that Indonesian politicians illegally accumulated funding,
such as through gratification which involves entrepreneurs. The incumbents may also
manipulate the local government budget allocation for their campaign financial support and
it may involve external parties, including the entrepreneurs. The politicians used the funding
legally and illegally in building their political supports and to enrich themselves. The
entrepreneurs who gave offerings to the politicians expected that they would get repayment
in the future in the form of budget allocation, projects, or business assurance.
In several regencies, the regents used their power as rent seizing (Ross 2004). In this
case, the regent in power could restructure the government institutions in such way that
s/he could gain direct, exclusive authority with discretionary on government assets. As the
result, the regent could control the bribery practices within the bureaucracy, and could grant
commendation or sanction to parties involved, both from the politicians and bureaucrats’
1
The writers are the members of ICW working group. They are grateful to assistance provided by Luky Djani,
Blair Palmer, Laurel Maclaren and Frans Siahaan for their valuable critics and input in the process of writing this
report.
2
See research on political patronage by ICW (2011), Badoh (2011), Djani (2013), McCarthy (2004), Ross
(2004), Valsecchi (2012), Aspinall (2011), Mietzner (2011), Varkkey (2012), Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken
(2007), Erb and Sulistyanto (2009), Aspinall and Mietzner (2010), Aspinall and van Klinken (2011).

25
side, and from the private parties.
In areas with forests, the political elites did not only have access to the local
government budget, they also made use forests. The forest conversion process is closely
related to politics. Burgess (2011) in his quantitative research shows the link between local
elections and deforestation, or political logging cycle, in which an increase of illegal logging
was detected a year before the local election. The research also found that the increase of
deforestation rate also correlates with expansion of new regencies. Those who are familiar
with the process of obtaining permit for land conversion would admit that the long
procedure and tight requirements for forest conversation in fact open the opportunities for
corruption. The practice did not only involve actors in the local level, but also in the national
level.
The study is going to answer several questions. First, how do local political elites in
areas with rich forest resources gather funding? Second, how do they gain and maintain
support from voters? Third, what are the impacts of patronage on forest resources and land
conversion? To see the correlation between patronage and land conversion, the study
observed the cases of two areas, i.e. Ketapang Regency in West Kalimantan and West Kutai
Regency in East Kalimantan. The findings of this study are aimed as recommendations to
policy makers to produce and apply policies that can prevent and decrease the impacts of
patronage to forest conversion in regency level.
West Kutai Regency, East Kalimantan
76% of the total area of West Kutai Regency, East Kalimantan, consists of forests. Of
its total area of 3,162, 800 hectares, 2, 344,589 hectares are classified as forests areas. In
this regency, neither illegal logging nor the forest concession through the business permits
to utilize forest and plantation resources (Logging and Industrial Timber Concessions
Permit/ IUPHHK-HT/ Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu-Hutan Tanaman) issued to
private companies and government-owned companies that affect deforestation. Rather, the
main factor in deforestation is the expansion of coal mines, oil palm and rubber plantations.
In the past ten years, there has been a major political competition between Rama
Asia (2001-2006 Regent) and Ismael Thomas (2001-2005 Vice Regent) in this regency. In
2001 election, both were supported by PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan/Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle). Then, in 2006 election, Ismael run as the
candidate for regent and won the election with the support of coalition of PDI-P and PAN
(Partai Amanat Nasional/National Mandate Party), while Rama run against him with the
support of coalition of Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party), Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS/
Prosperity Peace Party), and Partai Pelopor (Pioneer Party). In 2011 election, Ismael run
again and effectively lobbied Partai Demokrat to abandon Rama and supported him instead.
Rama was abandoned by Partai Demokrat and run with the support of Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa (PKB/National Awakening Party) and PIS (Partai Indonesia Sejahtera/Prosperous
Indonesia Party) only. Ismael finally won the 2011 election for the second term. The change
of party support shows that the political parties were only motivated by the highest bidder.
The support of major political parties to Ismael Thomas did not create a significant
discrepancy in the number of votes. The discrepancy was only 5%-6% between them, with
the total of 85% votes of all voters.
The study looked closely on how Ismael Thomas mobilized the support and
resources to win the election by mapping his “Success Team” and network. Some PDI-P

26
supporters who run several companies were Ismael Thomas’ major supporters, such as
Julius Suryadi, the Director of Sendawar Media. In addition, Edy Gunawan, the owner of PT.
Teras Punai Tanajaya, seemed to play an important role in financing Ismael’s campaigns in
2011. Edy Gunawan is suspected to be put by Ismael Thomas to get coal mine concession
through his subsidiary company, PT. Bumi Enggang Katulistiwa (BEK), a coal mining
company. During Ismael’s first term, PT. BEK was granted a large scale permit for coal
mining, and this company was suspected to be linked with Ismael Thomas3
. At the beginning
of its founding, the book value of BEK was merely 5 billion rupiah ($500,000), but its book
value reached more than 1 trillion rupiah ($10 million) when it was sold to Geo Energy
Group in 2011. It is widely known by public that the profit made during the sale of PT. BEK
was used by Ismael for his political campaigns.
As commonly found in local elections in many places, Ismael also has a strong
network in the communities through various organizations, like Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila
Youth), Pramuka (girls’ and boys’ scout), and even sport organizations such as KONI, bikers,
volley, billiard, badminton, and martial arts organizations. Ismael also founded “Presidium
Dewan Adat Dayak” (Dayak Tribal Councils Presidium) whose members received salary from
the local government budget. The network could be used to mobilize support and even to
buy votes.
In addition, Ismael Thomas put his relatives in several mass organizations to maintain
support. His son became the chair in the local chapter of Taruna Merah Putih, an
organization which is suspected to be affiliated with PDI-P. His brother in-law was the chair
of Karang Taruna (Youth Neighborhood Organization) in West Kutai Regency level. His other
relatives, such as his wife and in-laws, were the members of the local parliament. The map
of his social network and their supporters is presented in details in Figure 1.
3
Investigation on the document of the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights No. AHU-
12145.AH.01.01 in 2009 and State Gazette No. 52 on 30 June 2009, which later were crosschecked with the
websites
http://www.lpjk.org/modules/registrasi/detail_registrasi_badan_usaha.php?action=Tenaga_Kerja&ID_Badan
_Usaha=8893579&ID_Propinsi=17 and
http://www.lpjk.org/modules/registrasi/detail_registrasi_badan_usaha.php?action=Pengurus&ID_Badan_Us
aha=8893579&ID_Propinsi=17 confirmed the suspicion that this company had interest affiliation with the
Regent.

27
It is suspected that Ismael abused his power and may embezzle government
resources in 2011. As an incumbent, he gave funding to 149 co-ops with the total funding of
14.9 billion rupiah ($1.5 million). The suspicion is reasonable because after the election,
many co-ops which received the funding did not develop or even were closed without any
reports to the government on the use of the funding.
It is no doubt that Ismael Thomas had a close relation with coal mining companies.
Table 1 shows the number of mining permits issued that significantly increased since West
Kutai was under Ismael Thomas and Didik Effendy in 2006. For example, 223 mining permits
were issued only in 2011, and grew even more in 2012 with 267 permits being issued. The

28
total area under mining concession in West Kutai has reached 3,968,493 hectares, which
even exceeds its total area of 3,162,800 hectares.
Table 1. The Number of Permits and the Areas of Mining Concessions in West Kutai 2007-2012
Year Number of Permits Area (in Hectares)
2007 15 247,956
2009 138 395,486
2010 122 658,130
2011 223 1,217,624
2012 267 1,445,297
Source: Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (Jatam/Mining Advocacy Network) East Kalimantan
The relation pattern of Ismael Thomas in oil palm plantation is different with the one
in coal mining. As shown in Table 2 below, the increase in the issuance of oil palm plantation
permits occurred in 2008, i.e. 17 permits and it decreased to 7 permits in 2011.
Table 2. Recapitulation of the Area of Oil Palm Plantation and the Number of Permits Issued
Year Area (in Hectares) Number of Permits
2005 89,474.00 8
2006 44,724.00 3
2007 154,723.00 12
2008 215,351.00 17
2009 128,812.00 10
2010 131,281.00 10
2011 71,959.84 7
Source: Bureau of Plantation, Office of Plantation, Land, and Farming, West Kutai
Regency, updated in February 2012
One of the oil palm plantation companies that were given the permit to plan the
widest in West Kutai Regency is PT London Sumatera, and other companies such as Surya
Dumai Group and Tian Siang Holding (Malaysia). Such companies have been known to
practice patronage to gain permits for oil palm plantation in Indonesia (Varkkey, 2012).
Hence, it may be concluded that there is strong indication that patronage has
accelerated the number of permits issued for coal mining operation in West Kutai Regency.
In addition, considering that the number of permits issued for oil palm plantation increased
dramatically during the years after the first election, and that the practice illegal payment is
suspected to be the common modus operandi of oil palm plantation companies in
Indonesia, it may be reasonable to conclude that the executives received bribery through
the process of obtaining permits for oil palm plantations. Next, looking at the rate of forest
conversion in West Kutai Regency, it may be the proof that the rate of deforestation was
accelerated during the years after Ismael’s first election.
Table 3. The Rate of Deforestation in West Kutai
No Period Deforestation Rate (hectares/year)
1 2003-2006 8,818.6
2 2006-2009 14,117.2

29
3 2009-2011 4,957.4
Source: Directorate of Forest Resource Inventory and Control, Directorate General of
Forest Planning and Design, Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, from various years, and
Landsat 7 ETM+ satellite imaging pictures in 2012.
Ketapang, West Kalimantan
Ketapang Regency is the widest regency in West Kalimantan, with the total area of
31,588,000 hectares. Similar to West Kutai, Ketapang also has wide areas of forests. The
Bureau of Forests Area Stability (Balai Pemantapan Kawasan Hutan/BPKH) Pontianak stated
that Ketapang has the total area of forests of 1,916,449.89 and other purposes areas (Areal
Penggunaan Lain/APL) of 1,207,624.11 hectares.
During 2003-2006, the rate of deforestation in Ketapang is 72,005.5 hectares/year.
Compared to West Kutai, this number is considerably very high. The rate of deforestation in
Ketapang is significantly decreased during 2009-2011. The decrease is because the decrease
of the forests area in Ketapang. Although deforestation occurred, the rate of deforestation
in Ketapang is considerably higher than in West Kutai.
Table 4. Comparison of the Deforestation Rate in West Kutai and Ketapang
No Period Deforestation Rate
(hectares/year) in West Kutai
Deforestation Rate
(hectares/year) in Ketapang
1 2003-2006 8,818.6 72,005.5
2 2006-2009 14,117.2 37,741.9
3 2009-2011 4,957.4 9,859.5
Source: Ministry of Forestry, 2013
The patronage between politicians and entrepreneurs that occurred in Ketapang is
quite similar to the one in West Kutai. The difference is that in Ketapang, there was a
change of regents, from Morkes Effendy, the regent in 2000-2010, to Henrikus, the vice
regent in 2005-2010.
During Morkes Effendy’s term, he was highly suspected of using natural resources to
gather funding for his own wealth and political capital. The modus operandi was by frugally
issuing permits to wood, oil palm, and mining businesses. The permit issuance was
facilitated by his position as a regent which gave him authoritative power to conveniently do
so.
As one of the examples, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) with Kontak Rakyat
Borneo (Borneo People Contact) and Save Our Borneo have reported Morkes Effendy to KPK
in 2012, in the case of authority abuse (2006-2011) in which he issued Decree No. 337/2006
which gave PT. Karya Utama Tambang to exploit the area of Durian Sebatang, Ketapang for
mining purposes4
.
Nevertheless, it is not easy to prove that there was a patronage and bribery practice
behind the issuance of the permit. Information from some informants of this study in the
field may provide explanation of the patronage practice in Ketapang. One informant stated
that each permit had certain “tariff”5
. Of course, the said “tariff” is the bribe given to ease
4
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW). 2012. Corruption and Money Laundering Eradication Performance in
Forestry Sector. Unpublished paper.
5
Based on interviews with one of the external affairs staffs of an oil palm plantation company on 19 April 2013

30
the process of permit issuance. Furthermore, he explained that there was a particular oil
palm plantation company that was willing to pay about 2.6 – 5 million rupiah/hectare to
relevant parties/authorities, from the village heads to regents and other government
officers, in order to obtain the permit.
Another indication is that there were some mining companies whose deed of
establishment listed the name of the regent’s son, Yasir Ansyari. Some of such companies
are PT. Lanang Bersatu, PT. Jalin Inti, PT. Jalin Vaneo and PT. Serinding Sumber Makmur that
mine tin, galena, bauxite, and gold.
Considering the strategic authority that the regent plays in the process of permit
issuance, it may be assumed that Ketapang election is an important momentum to decide
which authority patron that will establish relations with the entrepreneurs in the next 5
years. Yasir Ansyari, Morkes Effendy’s son, run as a candidate for Ketapang regent in the
2010 election. He was supported by Golkar Party, the same party that supported Morkes
Effendy in the 2005 Ketapang election.
In the report to Local Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah/KPUD),
Yasir Ansyari spent the most campaign costs among the candidates6
. In addition to personal
funding, he was funded by many companies, both mining and construction companies.
Many claimed that Yasir Ansyari’s campaign funds were far higher than what he reported,
and mainly from entrepreneurs in mining and oil palm companies7
. He even sold some of his
mining companies, such as PT. Lanang Bersatu8
. In his campaign funds report, PT. Lanang
Bersatu and his other companies were listed as sponsors.
The increase in the number of mining permits issued during the two years before the
election may also be viewed as an indicator of patronage between Yasir Ansyari’s campaign
financing and land permits (See Figure 2 and 3)
Figure 2.
The Number of Mining Exploration Permit up to May 2010 in Ketapang Regency
in Ketapang.
6
In the campaign fund in report, Yasir Ansyari spent Rp. 3,241,200,000 ($3 million).
7
One member of Yasir Ansyari’s campaign team stated that the total cost of campaign spent by Yasir Ansyari for
the two rounds of election and the cost of the legal case of the result of the election in the Constitutional
Court was billions of rupiah (interview with one of the members of Yasir Ansyari campaign team on 26 April
2013 in Pontianak). The phenomena of fictitious campaign financing was discussed by Marcuz Mietzner in
“Funding Pilkada: Illegal Campaign Financing in Indonesia's Local Elections” in Edward Aspinall and Gerry van
Klinken, eds., The State and Illegality in Indonesia. Leiden : KITLV Press.
8
Based on interviews with a local activist in November 2012 in Ketapang.
2008 2009 2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80

31
Figure 3.
The Number of Mining Production Operation Permit up to May 2010 in Ketapang Regency
Sources: compiled from data in Bureau of Mining and Energy, West Kalimantan
2013 by Link-AR Borneo
In addition to big campaign funding, Yasir Ansyari who is from Malay ethnic group
used ethnic sentiments to ensure his victory. He chose a running mate who is a member of
Dayak tribe council. However, he was running against Henrikus, a strong competitor in the
election. The candidates run a tight competition that even led to a conflict with the Local
Election Commission, two rounds of election, and a legal case over the result of the election
that needed to be settled in the Constitutional Court.
Henrikus was supported by the coalition of Partai Demokrat, PDIP, and PAN, and
Cornelis, the then current governor of West Kalimantan who was also the chair of PDIP West
Kalimantan Area Advisory Board9
. Further analysis revealed that Cornelis’ support to
Henrikus is a part of his strategy for winning the 2012 West Kalimantan governor election. It
is important for Cornelis to secure his political support in Ketapang by supporting
Henrikus10
.
Henrikus chose Boyman Harun, the member of local parliament who is also the
brother of Sulian Harun, a contractor in Ketapang, as his running mate. Boyman Harun’s
relatives were also listed as the sponsors in Henrikus’ campaign financing report. The cost of
his campaign was less than Yasir Ansyari’s11
, but he received support from Dayak tribes
because he is a Dayaknese. The support from the tribes was also gained because he
promised to complete the construction of roads in rural areas and not to grant permits to
open new oil palm plantations which disregard the communities12
.
9
Interview with a high-rank party politician and the member of Ketapang Local Parliament on 12 April 2013 in
Ketapang.
10
Morkes Effendy lost against Cornelis in the 2012 West Kalimantan Governor Election.
11
In the report, the total income on Henrikus’ campaign funding was Rp. 1,107,500,000.
12
Tribun Pontianak. Pemilukada : Semua Cabup Nilai Pemda Gagal (Local Election: All Regent Candidates
Thought the Local Government Failed) Thursday, 13 May 2013, p. 8
2008 2009 2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
30

32
Other than ethnic sentiments in the election, Henrikus seemed to benefit from the
disappointments of the communities to Morkes Effendy. They were particularly
disappointed about the slow process of constructing infrastructures in rural areas, the
discontinuation of Pawan V bridge construction in Pawan River, and he was regarded as not
pro-community and frugally granting permits to oil palm and mining companies13
. Henrikus
finally won the election in the 2010 Ketapang election, with 7% margin of votes from Yasir
Ansyari.
Did Henrikus fulfill his promise after he was elected to be the regent? Unfortunately,
there are some indicators that the patronage practice between the head of the regency with
the entrepreneurs will continue. The bids in the projects of the local government were
suspected to “go through” Henrikus’ relatives, such as Alexander Tommy Henry, his second
son who is now registered as the candidate for the member of local parliament from PDIP.
Henrikus’ other son, Jecky Henrik, is now the officer who has the authority to decide on the
provision of goods and services at the Bureau of Public Works. This caused a lot of critics
because Jecky Henrik has not been certified in the provision of goods and services. The
communities were also disappointed because there have not been significant definite
actions in constructing infrastructure in the rural areas.
The circulation of local government leaders also affected the shift of the role of the
companies, albeit not thoroughly. One of the examples is PT. Kayong Agro Lestari (KAL) that
is publicly known to be close with Morkes Effendy. During Morkes’ term, the company
received easy treatment in the process of obtaining permits. The location of PT. KAL used to
be forests. During Morkes’ term, they applied for the permit to convert the forests into
Other Purposes Areas (Area Penggunaan Lain/APL) and succeeded. It was suspected that the
success was due to their relation with Morkes Effendy and his access to the national
authority. Morkes Effendy was even said to own shares in the 18,754 hectare oil palm
plantation company. They are currently in trouble, because their area is overlapping with
the area of a mining company that has relations with one of the members of local
parliament from PDIP who is also listed as Henrikus’ campaign team14
.
The newest satellite images show that Ketapang forests experience massive
destruction. As shown in Table 5. below, the coverage of forests has decreased significantly,
and even more than half coverage of forests has disappeared in the Limited Production
Forests (Hutan Produksi Terbatas/HPT) areas.
Table 5. Deforestation Rate According to Satellite Images Analysis in Ketapang, 2013
Forests Classification Official Coverage Areas Real Coverage Areas Discrepancy
Production Forests (Hutan
Produksi/ HP)
570,002 66,812.90 12%
Limited Production Forests
(Hutan Produksi Terbatas/HPT)
687,049 322,462.60 47%
13
Based on interviews with community members and informants, among a few, a director of a foundation
and a Catholic priest on 15 April 2013 in Ketapang. See also Tribun Pontianak. Pemilukada : Semua Cabup
Nilai Pemda Gagal (Local Election: All Regent Candidates Thought the Local Government Failed) Thursday,
13 May 2013, p. 8
14
Interview with a director of a foundation on 12 April 2013 in Ketapang

33
Converted Production Forests
(Hutan Produksi Konversi/HPK)
196,139 33,025.72 17%
Conservation Forests (Hutan
Lindung)
290,893 214,578.60 74%
National Parks 172,266 19,862 12%
Source: Link-AR Borneo, from satellite images analysis (2013)
Some said that Henrikus had inherited the problem of deforestation. This may be a
valid opinion considering the many permits that Morkes Effendy issued during his term as a
regent. However, the ease in granting permits continued in Henrikus’ term. The permits for
oil palm plantation in Ketapang were still issued even until 2012. In 2012, the land allocation
for oil palm plantation has reached 877, 550 hectares. Figure 4 shows the numbers of
production permit issuance and approval by Ketapang Regent during 2003-2012. As the
figure suggests, the oil palm plantation permits were mostly issued right before the election,
i.e. in 2005 and 2010.
Figure 4.
The Number of Oil Palm Plantation Permit Issuance in Ketapang Regency
Sources: data from Link-AR Borneo and Bureau of Forestry Ketapang Regency 2013 3
There were only few production permits issuance for logging/industrial timber
concessions in 2010 and even no issuance at all later in 2010, but the areas granted were
very wide, covering 959,035.74 hectares for 15 companies. It was even wider that the total
areas permitted for 88 oil palm plantation companies. There are not pulp companies in
Ketapang. Most timber from Ketapang was transported to Riau to be processed.
Figure 5.
The Number Logging/Industrial Timber Concession Permits in Ketapang Regency
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16

34
1997 1999 2000 2006 2007 2009 2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sources: data from Link-AR Borneo and Bureau of Forestry Ketapang Regency
It is evident in Ketapang that the change in leadership or the circulation of the heads
of the local government does not make the patronage practice between the head of the
local government/politician and the entrepreneur disappear. It is still practiced and even
developed into a new configuration. Although the promises that Henrikus made during his
campaign gave the communities a new hope of changes, the patronage and rent seizing
practices were only transferred from one politician’s network to another. One of the
problems is that both the past and the new regent which were supported by different
political parties needed substantial political capitals to be in power. The authority of the
regent to regulate the permit issuance policy seems to become a way out from the demands
of campaign funding and personal wealth.
As the result, the local election only became the momentum to consolidate the local
elites and the entrepreneurs. The importance of the local election is not on electing a local
leader who can improve the conditions of the locals. Rather, it is an important momentum
to decide who will be the ruling elite patron who can build relation with the entrepreneurs
in the next 5 years. This is the beginning of the patronizing politico-business relation
between the leader and the entrepreneurs
Conclusion
The study observed the patronage practices in two areas which are rich with forests
sources, i.e. Ketapang and West Kutai. The increase of the price of coal and palm oil
commodities in international market obviously promote massive investments in those
sectors in the two areas. The expansion requires vast lands, and it is relatively easier to
convert forests for that purpose.
In the two regencies, the center of the patronage network in the regency level is the
regent. So powerful was the regent that it created the practice of rent seizing, or the
practice in which the executive controlled almost all aspects in the bribery practices
between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Both in Ketapang and West Kutai, the regent
depended on the fee accumulated from granting the permits for converting lands in order
to get funding for securing power.
Another aspect of patronage that was observed in both regencies is the assignment
of the relatives of the regent as the owner of the companies that were later granted the
permission to mine coal. The companies owned by the relatives, along with the permits that
they had, were later sold to other companies when the regents needed funding, for
example for elections.

35
In Ketapang where there was a transition from an old regent to a new regent which
was supported by different parties, it is obvious how in such a short period of time the new
leader followed similar patronage pattern practiced by the old leader. It is suspected that
the practice of corruption in land conversion and permit issuance continued.
Recommendation
1. The government must ensure the availability of an official guideline for obtaining
permits for plantation and coal mining. The availability of an official guideline will
ensure that permits are only granted to companies with capabilities to manage
plantations and mines. The findings of this study show that permits were issued to
companies with no capabilities and later were sold to investors to gain profits.
2. The government must also conduct reviews on the permits that have been issued,
particularly those which are suspected to be obtained by violating the procedures,
that overlapped with other permits, and should consider the social and ecological
impacts of the permits issuance.
3. To increase the transparency and accountability of land conversion, the involvement
of a third party is very crucial in ensuring that the process runs properly and that
there will be no corruption or bribery practices in the process of obtaining the
permits. The cost and the length of time needed in obtaining the permit need to be
clearly informed to the applicants. The existing regulations, such as Government
Regulation No. 10 in 2010 in junction with Government Regulation No. 60 in 2012
have not regulated the specific fee for obtaining the permit and it opened the
opportunities for corruption practices.
4. A mechanism to prevent conflicts of interests is necessary, so that the concessions
will not be granted to the relatives or cronies of government officials who do not
have the capacities to manage plantations and mines.
5. The law enforcement forces, particularly the Commission for Corruption Eradication
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/ KPK), must pay attention to the process of land
conversion and mining concession bidding. The many corruption practices in the
process of obtaining permits may impede the government from achieving its target
in reducing emission in 2020. The law needs to be enforced immediately because
there has been much information about corruption practices in land conversion. KPK
could serve as the coordinator for the law enforcement process.
6. KPK has to ensure that the regulation to submit a report on the wealth of state
officials (Laporan Harta Kekayaan Pejabat Negara/LHKPN) is obeyed and that the
report is updated by the public officials, particularly by local leaders. LHKPN should
not only include the personal wealth of the officials, but also the properties under
the names of their children and relatives.
7. The study reveals the link between land conversion and political interests,
particularly in winning the local election. Therefore, it is necessary for the Election
Commission to strictly oversee the election process to ensure that political funding is
managed according to the regulations. The regulations on political funding can be
included into the draft of the law on local election that is currently being discussed
by the parliament and the government.
The public must also understand the impacts of corruption practices in land conversion and

36
permit issuance to plantations and mines on the environment. Corruption does not only
harm government financial condition, but will also harm the public due to the potential
disasters that may happen. Therefore, the study recommended particularly to the public to:
1. Actively keep track of the wealth of politicians, particularly the regent. The
ownership of companies linked to industries that convert land must be reported to
KPK immediately and crosschecked with report on the wealth of state officials
(Laporan Harta Kekayaan Pejabat Negara/LHKPN).
2. Review the permits issued for utilizing the lands. CSO must also actively use the law
on Public Information Disclosure to access necessary data.
3. Conduct investigation and report any environmental damages caused by mining and
oil palm plantation activities.

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