This is one of the handful of classic books on the subject of war, and one made easier to navigate with the addition of a valuable index.
“If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen [in war], two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” —Carl von Clausewitz
Prussian General Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Swiss Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) lived in Europe in the age of Napoleon, with both vying for the title of “Father of Modern Military Strategy.” Clausewitz believed each situation had its own solution, with, unlike Jomini, no general solution given. Clausewitz explored the fundamental nature of war and emphasized the defensive-offensive. A self-disciplined, competent Prussian staff officer, Clausewitz had been a professional soldier since the age of twelve. As dean of modern military theorists, he proposed in On War that absolute war (an ideal with a high level of energy and professionalism; not “total war”) cannot exist because “countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance.” … “But War is no pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of a free enthusiasm: it is a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means.”
Clausewitz’s influence has been profound. He believed in the defensive strength, urged a greater democracy for Prussia’s citizens, and thought war a serious, hazardous business. Yet, because understanding him was difficult, many of his early students merely focused only upon his most forceful expressions. As a result, for over fifty years, Clausewitz was denounced as a “Prussianist,” a fanatical believer in mass warfare, and a champion of the offensive, regardless of losses. “Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until someone steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.” Furthermore, “It is necessary to either wage war with the utmost energy, or not at all.”
One of Clausewitz’s most significant contributions was his emphasis on the moral forces in war. This emphasis includes his concept of “friction in war,” which explains why military theory often proves challenging to put into practice. “Strategic problems may be very simple, but they still will not be easy to solve. ... The Commander…finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information, of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, through haste; of disregard of his authority, either from mistaken on correct motives, from ill will, true or false sense of duty; of indolence or exhaustion, of accidents, which no mortal could have foreseen. In short, he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions, most of which are intimidating, few of which are encouraging. By long experience in War, one acquires the sensitive perception [necessary] for quickly determining the [true] value of these incidents; high courage and stability of character stand proof against them, as the rock resists the beating of the waves. ... Further, there is hardly any celebrated enterprise in War which was not achieved by endless exertions, pains, and privations; ...only an immense force of will... can conduct us to our goal. Therefore, a commander requires a cool intelligence, a strength of character, and audacity, as well as technical competence. The calculation of time and space, although it is always the foundation of strategy, is neither its most difficult nor most decisive element.... The correct judgment of their opponents, the audacity to leave only a small force before them. ...energy in forced marches, boldness in sudden attacks, the intensified activity which great souls acquire in the moment of danger, these are...(what wins) victories.... Boldness, directed by overruling intelligence, is the mark of the hero.”
Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz is said to have scoffed at the thought that there were principles of war. However, On War does suggest the following general principles (or generalizations):
Discover how to gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. [Center of Gravity]—Identify the decisive point and concentrate everything on it, removing forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives. Calculate moral factors. Make the best use of the few means at one’s disposal. Never lack calmness and firmness...without this firm resolution, no great results can be achieved in the most successful war. Always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution...no military leader has ever become great without audacity. Forces are more effective in a concentric [“interior lines”] rather than in a parallel attack; one can attack concentrically without having decisive superiority in an engagement. Always seek to envelop that part of the enemy against which we direct our main attack. Cut off the enemy from his line of retreat. To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy, always direct one’s principal operation against the main body of the enemy army or at least against an important portion of his forces. Take possession of the enemy’s material and other sources of strength and direct operations against the places where most of these resources are concentrated. To gain public opinion, win through great victories and the occupation of the enemy's capital. Use one’s entire force with the utmost energy. Focus on the decisive point of attack. Never waste time. Use surprise more in tactics than in strategy. Pursue the enemy after his defeat. Concentrate forces at the main point. An attack on the lines of communication takes effect only very slowly, while victory on the battlefield bears fruit immediately. In strategy, the side surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side surrounding its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces. To cut the enemy’s line of retreat, a strategic envelopment or a turning movement is very effective. Be physically and morally superior. Preserve stores of supplies, upon which operations absolutely depend. Provisioning troops is a necessary condition of warfare and thus greatly influences operations. Act independently. Knowledge must become capability. For a different, relatively short overview of Clausewitz’s advice, check out his Principles of War, the precursor to On War, available in a free online version.
Note: Clausewitz uses the term Center of Gravity (CoG) about 40 times in his book, with various implied meanings. The definition of a CoG, as given by the United States Department of Defense, is “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” CoG = Schwerpunkt = heavy point = focal point = decisive point = main emphasis. Clausewitz most often implied that the CoG is where mass is concentrated. Thus, if this vital point is unprotected, it is the most attractive target for a blow.
Of value is Amazon’s “Look inside” feature, giving one an overview and sample of what’s in the book. There one will find: Table of Contents, Editors’ Note. Book 1, Chapters 1. What is War 2. Purpose and Means in War, and most of Chapter 3. On Military Genius.
Missing in the “Look inside” overview are, between the Editors’ Note (by Howard and Paret) and Book 1, Introductory Essays (3, by Parent Howard, and Brodie).
Then follow 8 Books: 1. On the Nature of War, 2. On the Theory of War, 3. On Strategy in General, 4. The Engagement, 5. Military Forces, 6. Defense, 7. The Attack, 8. War Plans.
Next, there is the Commentary (A Guide to Reading On War by Bernard Brodie). The reader would probably find benefit by skimming this section at the end of the book before starting to read at the beginning.
Finally, and again, this edition of On War has a very valuable index of names and places. Unfortunately, it does not include concepts, a feature that while valuable, might, however, prove difficult to assemble.
Bottom-line, this is a relatively difficult book to read, but, as a recognized masterpiece, it remains a must-have for any complete library on military strategy.
If interested in more information about strategy (to include a section on Clausewitz), consider reading the following book which distills and integrates the works of 87 master strategists: Strategic Advantage: How to Win in War, Business, and Life
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Top reviews from the United States
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- Reviewed in the United States on August 18, 2023
- Reviewed in the United States on March 17, 2014
Top reviews from other countries
- AAReviewed in the United Kingdom on April 16, 2018
The Classic Howard, Paret translation
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- pahuntReviewed in the United Kingdom on March 2, 2017
Excellent edition of a classic of military thought
