Chilcot report: Tony Blair's ambitions and panic revealed in private memos to George Bush

Partnership: George Bush and Tony Blair exchanged memos before and during the war

Tony Blair’s grandiose ambitions for war – and his growing panic as it all went wrong – are laid bare in an extraordinary series of private notes to George Bush.

Thirty newly revealed memos disclose that he accused European leaders of “behaving stupidly” by refusing to side with the United States.

He told the president in July 2002: “This is the moment when you can define international politics for the next generation: the true post-cold war world order.

“Our ambition is big: to construct a global agenda around which we can unite the world; rather than dividing it into rival centres of power.”

The British leader heaped praise on Mr Bush’s “insight” but warned that a “ludicrous and distorted view of the US is clouding the enormous attraction of the fundamental goal”.

A handwritten note from Tony Blair praising George Bush's 'brilliant' speech 
Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images

He wrote in July 2002: “In the past weeks I have had conversations with intelligent Europeans which has vividly illustrated this for me.”

Mr Blair explained one compared the US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld with Osama bin Laden and another wanted a closer relationship with Russia rather than the US.

“In other words, rational people are behaving very stupidly,” he complained.

In the same note, Mr Blair stated: “Although Iraq’s WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is the immediate justification for action, ridding Iraq of Saddam is the real prize.”

'I'll be with you whatever': A key line from the memos from Blair to Bush (Iraq Inquiry/PA )
Iraq Inquiry/PA

One note from the PM to the president was handwritten, showing the intimacy Mr Blair was seeking to establish with the powerful US leader.

He heaped praise on Mr Bush for “a brilliant speech” that would force people to “come up to the mark”.

The memo, dated 12 September, 2002, after a UN General Assembly address, said: “Dear George, It was a brilliant speech. It puts us in exactly the right strategy to get the job done. The reception has been very positive with everyone now challenged to come up to the mark. Well done.

“Yours ever, Tony”

The day after 9/11 Mr Blair said stopping the spread of WMD “will require action that some will baulk at. But we are better to act now and explain and justify our actions than let the day be put off until some further, perhaps even worse catastrophe occurs.”

On October 11 2001 he wrote of “a real willingness in the Middle East to get Saddam out”, showing that Bush was already pressing for regime change.

But he warned: “If we hit Iraq now, we would lose the entire Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU... I am sure we can devise a strategy for Saddam deliverable at a later date.”

Mr Blair said that “a dedicated tightly knit propaganda unit” was required.

Chilcot report: Blair's note to Bush

In December Mr Blair talked about “softening up” public opinion by working with UN inspectors.

On July 28 2002 he wrote: “I will be with you, whatever. But this is the moment to assess bluntly the difficulties. The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf War.”

On February 19 2003, weeks before war, Mr Blair wrote a lengthy note suggesting a second UN resolution as an “ultimatum” to Saddam.

In June, after the invasion, he admitted the dangers of post-war chaos. “The task is absolutely awesome and I’m not at all sure we’re geared for it. This is worse than rebuilding a country from scratch. My sense is: we’re going to get there but not quickly enough. And if it falls apart, everything falls apart in the region.”

On June 5 his worries were plain when he wrote: “By this time next year, it better be going right, not wrong. For us and for the world!”

With the failure to find WMD, Blair wrote on February 1, 2004: “If we have to accept that some of the Iraq intelligence was wrong, we will do so. But let us not either a) lurch to the opposite extreme and start pretending Iraq had nothing; or b) let any intelligence inaccuracy move us off confronting the WMD issue.”

After visiting Baghdad he said: “I left Iraq, on balance, more optimistic not less...The Government obviously has a clear sense of mission...”

But he warned that “the nature of the insurgency is changing...hence Basra becoming a problem”.

In 2006, desperate for a success before he left office, Mr Blair, wrote: “This is the time to go for it; to take risks. To strive and fail is so much better than not striving. But actually, I think it could just succeed and in doing so give us the strong finish we both want.”

He added: “The stalemate has to end …. This is the time to cash in all of our chips here.”