Free to Choose but Liable for
the Consequences: Should NonVaccinators Be Penalized for the
Harm They Do?
Arthur L. Caplan, David Hoke, Nicholas J. Diamond, and
Viktoriya Karshenboyem
I. Introduction
Consider this hypothetical scenario involving a choice
not to vaccinate a child. Ms. S has a niece who is autistic. The girl’s parents are suspicious that there is some
relationship between her autism and her Measles
Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccination. They have
shared their concerns with Ms. S. She then declines
to have her own daughter, Jinny S., vaccinated with
the MMR vaccine. To bypass the state’s mandatory
vaccination requirement, Ms. S claims a state-legislated “philosophical exemption,” whereby she simply
attests to the fact that she is opposed to vaccinating
her daughter due to a “conscientiously held belief.” At
the age of four, Jinny goes on a trip by airplane to Germany with her mother. After returning to the United
States, she attends daycare despite having some mild
cold symptoms. Subsequently, she develops a classic
measles rash, at which point her mother brings her to
a pediatrician and keeps her home from daycare.
About one week later, a one-year-old daycare classmate of Jinny’s — Michael P. — develops a severe illness. The little boy is too young to receive the MMR
Arthur L. Caplan, Ph.D., is the Drs. William F and Virginia
Connolly Mitty Professor and Head of the Division of Bioethics at New York University Langone Medical Center. David
Hoke, M.D., M.B.E., is an Emergency Medicine Resident at
Cooper University Hospital in Camden, NJ. He is a graduate
of Jeferson Medical College, holds a Masters in Bioethics from
the University of Pennsylvania, and earned his Bachelor of
Science degree in Biology with Honors from Villanova University. Nicholas J. Diamond, J.D., is currently pursing a
Masters of Bioethics at the Perelman School of Medicine at
University of Pennsylvania. He holds a law degree from the
Charleston School of Law and a Bachelor of Arts degree in
philosophy from Georgetown University. Viktoriya Karshenboyem, J.D., is an Associate in the New York oice of Kaye
Scholer.
606
vaccine, although his parents intend to have him vaccinated when appropriate. A pediatrician determines
that Michael also has measles. Unfortunately, after
being hospitalized, the child dies. Michael’s parents
have heard that Jinny previously had the measles and
know, from a prior conversation with Ms. S on the
playground, that she is strongly against vaccinations.
Distraught by Michael’s sudden death and believing
that Ms. S, by choosing to not vaccinate her child, is
responsible for his death, Michael’s parents ask their
local district attorney to ile criminal charges. They
also consult with an attorney, suspecting that even if a
criminal lawsuit is unsuccessful, they might be able to
recover damages from Ms. S in civil court.1
Is there a case for holding non-vaccinators legally
liable for harm caused to others by their inaction?
This will depend on the answers to two questions.
First, does the scientiic capability exist to prove that
Jinny infected Michael with measles? If so, are there
legal grounds for either criminal or civil liability?
Can Science Link Jinny’s Measles Infection to
Michael’s Death?
Can biomedical science reliably ascertain the source
of a measles infection, such that it could determine
whether one person transmitted the measles virus to
another? In the law, if there is not suicient scientiic
evidence of transmission from Jinny to Michael, causation cannot be determined, and there is no viable
legal case.
There is adequate scientiic capability to determine
with a great deal of conidence, though not absolute
certainty, that one person transmitted the measles
virus to another, but there is not much scientiic literature that directly addresses the question of causation
for the measles. Therefore, most of the available evijournal of law, medicine & ethics
Caplan, Hoke, Diamond, and Karshenboyem
dence must be derived from expert testimony. However, if this hypothetical case were litigated, qualiied
experts would likely be asked to interpret the data and
make the causal link.
we are getting frequent importation of viruses
wit [sic] the same sequence into various locations in the US.3
In the view of this CDC expert, the most useful
method in establishing causation is epidemiology rather than laboratory methods. A thorough
Is there a case for holding non-vaccinators
investigation would need to be undertaken to
legally liable for harm caused to others by
present a timeframe of symptom onset with both
their inaction?
children. Scientists would need to determine if
Jinny contracted measles during her trip to Germany or if she contracted it while in the United
Donald Jungkind, Ph.D., is the Director of Clinical
States. A thorough vetting of common contacts would
Microbiology Laboratories at Thomas Jeferson Unibe required.
versity in Philadelphia. According to Dr. Jungkind:
Viral sequencing alone is not the best technique for
proving causation. Despite the fact that laboratory
The [Center for Disease Control (CDC)] is
studies have shown mutation rates that rival HIV,4
interested in the epidemiology of measles
ield studies have shown the virus to be much more
cases because that can be important to deine
stable, eliminating the possibility of accurately tracktransmission and institute prevention. Most
ing predictable mutations from one person to another.
measles in the USA begins as an imported
Sequence identity can reliably rule out a patient by
case. CDC allows labs to send specimens to the
matching sequences. However, it can only “rule in”
public health system where at either the city,
transmission by conirming that both children had the
state, or federal level, they culture the virus and
same viral strain and that one possibly transmitted the
get it “ingerprinted” at CDC. CDC has a World
virus to the other.
Health Organization database where they can
An important question raised by laboratory methmatch the strain to see where it came from. They
ods is how reliably one can isolate the virus. As recently
can tell if it came from a city in England, from a
as 1998, a key reference work claimed that “[p]ractiparticular African country, etc. They could deically, the diagnosis of acute infections caused by MMR
nitely link primary and secondary cases in this
viruses has to be based on serological assays since
country.2
these viruses or viral antigens are rarely recovered or
detected from infected individuals.”5 What does that
When a representative of the CDC was asked about
mean? Most people will probably not know. However,
causation in the hypothetical case of Jinny and
a more recent CDC publication indicates that, while
Michael, he said,
still technically diicult, viral isolation has become
much more reliable. Currently, the CDC recommends
The best way to link the infections in the sceoropharyngeal or nasopharyngeal swabs as primary
nario that is described would be epidemiologicollection methods, and urine collection as preferable
cally. For example, a child in a US daycare setif collection is delayed more than 5 days after rash
ting [like Michael] is not likely to have multiple
onset.6 Best collection times are within 3 days, ideally
exposures of measles. Assuming that measles
within 7, and not past 10 days after rash onset.7 Both
is conirmed by some laboratory method (IgM
children in the hypothetical scenario likely would have
detection and/or PCR), the exposure patterns
had samples taken in the normal course of clinical
and timing of the appearance of clinical signs
care in this time frame.
should be able to identify the source. Yes, we
While viral collection and sequencing can be
can sequence viruses and we would expect that
helpful in establishing causation, a causal claim
viruses in the same chain of transmission would
ultimately must depend on epidemiology for conhave identical sequences in the 450 nt window
irmation of transmission. Essentially, measles is a
used for genotyping. So, sequence identity could
rare and reportable disease. Making contact with
help conirm the epi link with the important
someone else infected with measles is incredibly
caveat that viruses with identical sequences will
rare because the incidence of measles is so low in the
also be detected if there are multiple imporUnited States. Researchers can follow and analyze
tations from the same source. For example,
measles cases to establish temporal and spatial links
right now there is a lot of measles in Europe and
from person to person.
conflicts of interest in the practice of medicine • fall 2012
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IND EPEND ENT
This type of tracking would provide a reliable case
for causation in our hypothetical case. Assuming Jinny
contracted measles while in Germany, it is unlikely
that Michael had encountered another individual with
measles. Epidemiological analysis could link the two
children with a high degree of conidence if all evidence supported transmission.8
Utilizing the scientiic tools available today, it cannot be proven with 100 percent certainty that Jinny
infected Michael with measles. Nevertheless, current
scientiic techniques could lead experts to state they
believe that the preponderance of the evidence, with
95 percent certainty or better, that Jinny infected
Michael.
II. Legal Analysis of Civil and Criminal
Liability
Is there the potential for civil or criminal liability in
the hypothetical? A strong argument can be that a
prima facie case for civil liability exists under a theory
of tortious negligence. There may also be the potential
for criminal liability.
Civil Liability
In the hypothetical, tort liability provides a direct avenue for Mr. and Mrs. P to seek recovery for the harm
sufered as a result of the loss of their son. Under a
theory of tortious negligence, Mr. and Mrs. P could
bring a cause of action that seeks to hold Ms. S. liable
for failing to have Jinny vaccinated.9 As others have
noted, “Tort liability could encourage vaccination of
children among parents who might otherwise take
advantage of the easy availability of a philosophical
exemption.”10
To establish a prima facie case for tortious negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the
defendant owed the plaintif a legal duty, requiring
the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks; (2) the defendant has breached that duty; (3)
the breach of that duty was both the direct and proximate cause of the harm sufered; and (4) the plaintif sufered damages.11 The plaintif must prove these
elements by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that the plaintif need not exclude every possible
explanation. Rather, reasonable persons may conclude
that the defendant’s action was a substantial cause of
the harm sufered.12
Duty
The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the
court.13 California courts have held that a legal duty
is an expression of the “sum total” of policy considerations that guide the law in determining whether the
608
plaintif is entitled to protection.14 Similarly, Michigan
courts have cited that the “determination of whether a
duty should be imposed upon a defendant is based on
a balancing of the societal interest involved, the severity of the risk, the burden upon the defendant to meet
the duty, the likelihood of occurrence and the relationship between the parties.”15 Maryland courts have
held that an individual has a legal duty to refrain from
conduct that a reasonable person would know, or have
reason to know, might constitute an unreasonable risk
of harm to others.16 Courts have long held that individuals with hazardous, contagious diseases have a legal
duty to protect others from the danger of infection.17
The foreseeability of harm is a crucial factor in
determining the existence and scope of an individual’s
legal duty.18 As the Maryland Court of Appeals has
held,
One who knows he or she has a highly infectious
disease can readily foresee the danger that the
disease may be communicated to others with
whom the infected person comes into contact. As
a consequence, the infected person has a duty to
take reasonable precautions — whether by warning others or by avoiding contact with them — to
avoid transmitting the disease.19
In order for the defendant to foresee the harm, she
must have either actual or constructive knowledge.20
Constructive knowledge encompasses a gamut of possible mental states, such as “one who is deliberately
indiferent in the face of an unjustiiably high risk of
harm,” or “one who merely should know of a dangerous condition.”21
Duty with an Exemption
The extant case law across all jurisdictions is bereft of
cases directly factually similar to the Jinny/Michael
hypothetical. Courts have, however, considered liability for the negligent transmission of an infectious
disease — ranging from smallpox to herpes — since
Smith v. Baker22 in 1884, where the court held a parent liable for negligently taking his children, who
were infected with whopping cough, to the plaintif ’s
boarding house. Nevertheless, in the case of Jinny,
where a parent has validly utilized the statutory protection aforded by a philosophical exemption, establishing that a duty exists and, subsequently, has been
breached, is diicult.23
Case law supports a need to manage the incidence
of infectious disease by requiring of individuals who
knowingly have a communicable disease to take reasonable precautions to prevent its spread. While Ms.
S has a strong argument that she was merely relying
journal of law, medicine & ethics
Caplan, Hoke, Diamond, and Karshenboyem
on the statutory protection aforded by a philosophical exemption, Mr. and Mrs. P may nonetheless assert
that such an exemption does not negate the fundamental duty one has to act reasonably in preventing
the spread of disease to others. One can make a legitimate, state-sanctioned choice not to vaccinate, but
that does not protect the person making that choice
against the consequences of that choice for others.
If this argument were advanced, Mr. and Mrs. P
Breach
Returning to the original hypothetical, supposing that
Mr. and Mrs. P have successfully demonstrated that a
duty of care exists. Ms. S should have taken reasonable
precautions to reduce the potential risk of Jinny acting as a vehicle for the spread of an infectious disease.
These reasonable precautions could well encompass,
notifying those with whom Jinny regularly comes into
contact, e.g., people at her school, that she has not
been vaccinated and refraining from participation in activities that have a high potential to
spread the disease, if there is a reasonable conOne can make a legitimate, statecern that Jinny has become infected. If Ms. S
sanctioned choice not to vaccinate, but
had not taken measures such as these, it would
that does not protect the person making
be likely that the court would ind that the duty
of care has been breached.
that choice against the consequences of
that choice for others.
would need to demonstrate that, though Ms. S did not
have actual knowledge that Jinny had measles when
she came into contact with Michael, she did have
constructive knowledge. Absent vaccination, Jinny
was part of a group at high risk for the development
of measles. A parent in Ms. S’s position could foresee
that, without vaccination, the likelihood that a child
such as Jinny might contract measles was substantially higher than if she had been vaccinated. Mr. and
Mrs. P would, in turn, need to demonstrate that a reasonable person in Ms. S’s positions would have a duty
to take further steps regarding the ramiications of
Jinny not being vaccinated.
Duty without an Exemption
A closely related scenario, which is perhaps more
common, retains all of the facts of the original hypothetical, save the sole change that Ms. S does not claim
a philosophical exemption to the vaccine mandate —
she simply does not have her child vaccinated. Absent
the statutory protection aforded by the philosophical
exemption, it will be far easier for Mr. and Mrs. P to
prove the existence of a legal duty to protect against
the consequences of that choice.
In the hypothetical, the philosophical exemption
served as an initial line of defense for Ms. S. In the
case of a simple failure to vaccinate, however, Ms. S’s
position will be far more vulnerable. Now she will have
to defeat Mr. and Mrs. P’s plausible argument that Ms.
S had a legal duty — given the combination of constructive knowledge and the foreseeability that Jinny
was at risk for measles — to act as would be expected
of a reasonable person and take further precautions to
prevent harm to others.
Causation
Causation requires that, as a factual matter, the
defendant’s act directly contributed to producing the plaintif ’s injury or loss. Traditionally, courts
have used the “but for” test to determine whether
the defendant’s act satisied this requirement. Under
this test, the defendant’s conduct satisies causation
where the event would not have occurred but for her
conduct.24 Mr. and Mrs. P must demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Jinny’s being ill
directly caused Michael’s death.
In the hypothetical, demonstrating causation would
largely be a product of laboratory testing supported by
epidemiological inquiry as presented in expert aidavits. The scientiic evidence would then strongly support the claim that Jinny was, in fact, the source of
Michael’s fatal disease. Consequently, Mr. and Mrs. P
would likely be able to support their case.
Proximate causation imposes limits on causation
such that the efects of remote or unexpected and
unforeseen consequences are negated. To satisfy
proximate causation, Mr. and Mrs. P would have to
demonstrate that Ms. S’s actions were a substantial
factor in bringing about the alleged injury. In short, a
court would consider whether Ms. S could have foreseen Michael’s death. In making this determination,
the court would weigh the risks of Ms. S’s failure to
vaccinate Jinny, her failure to warn others with whom
she regularly came into contact, and her failure to
withhold her child from daycare when she was ill,
knowing potentially vulnerable children were present. A jury would have to ascertain whether a reasonable person in Ms. S’s position would have anticipated
the risk of Michael’s death such that the failure to
vaccinate Jinny was a substantial factor in bringing
about that death.
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There are no reported cases in which criminal liability has been imposed on
parents for failing to vaccinate their children, where such failure has caused the
death of another. Nevertheless, a valid criminal claim could be brought especially
against a non-vaccinator acting outside the shield of a legislative exemption.
Damages
Assuming that the irst three elements of the prima
facie case have been successfully demonstrated, Mr.
and Mrs. P would not have any diiculty in showing
that they have sufered actual damages. Mr. and Mrs.
P would be able to recover general damages — to compensate for pain and sufering as a result of the loss
of their son Michael—and special damages — to compensate for quantiiable expenses incurred in treating
his measles.
Criminal Liability
There are no reported cases in which criminal liability
has been imposed on parents for failing to vaccinate
their children, where such failure has caused the death
of another. Nevertheless, a valid criminal claim could
be brought especially against a non-vaccinator acting
outside the shield of a legislative exemption. A New
York court has held that a parent’s knowing failure to
have his child vaccinated against measles in the midst
of a measles outbreak or epidemic could rise to the
level of neglect under New York’s Family Court Act.25
This instance highlights the willingness of courts to
consider more than mere civil liability for the failure
to vaccinate, where a situation is especially dire.
The case against Ms. S, however, probably could
not be for neglect, as the hypothetical posits that she
availed herself of the statutory protection aforded by
a philosophical exemption. This claim insulates her
from criminal liability under neglect. Rather, Mr. and
Mrs. P might pursue a claim for criminally negligent
homicide since criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.26
a state law permitting exemptions, that may not create
complete protection against liability for the adverse
consequences of that choice. Choices about vaccination have consequences, and sometimes, sadly, deadly
consequences. It will be up to the courts to determine
whether exemption statutes suice to give complete
protection against liability no matter how negligent,
risky, or indiferent to the welfare of others a non-vaccinating parent is in exposing a child to others. The
scientiic and legal foundation for bringing charges
against non-vaccinators for the harm they do exists.
Acknowledgements
The authors also wish to acknowledge helpful comments from
members of the Center for Vaccine Ethics and Policy. Their website
can be found at: http://www.centerforvaccineethicsandpolicy.org/.
References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
III. Conclusion
Can parents who choose not to vaccinate their children
be held legally liable for any harm that results? The
state of laboratory and epidemiological understanding
of a disease such as measles makes it likely that a persuasive causal link can be established between a decision to vaccinate, a failure to take appropriate precautions to isolate a non-vaccinated child who may have
been exposed from highly vulnerable persons, and
death. Liability could certainly exist if a parent simply
chose not to vaccinate his child and a death results.
Even if a parent chooses to not vaccinate a child under
610
8.
This scenario is loosely based on ictional Season 10, Episode
19 of Law & Order: Special Victims Unit.
D. Jungkind, “Re: Tracing Viruses,” email to David Hoke,
March 7, 2011 (emphasis added).
CDC NCIRD DVD Inquiry, “FW: ‘FW: Tracking Viruses,’”
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“Placing a clear level of certainty on this is pretty diicult… I
would be making up percentages on this but would say 90-95%
certain…assuming there was no one else the infant came into
contact with that had measles.” E. Lautenbach, “Hypothetical
Measles Question,” email to David Hoke, April 13, 2011; I
think the epidemiological evidence can build a strong case but
I think certainty is not possible. if all of the epidemiological
features pointed to the irst child infecting the second, then
I think the certainty of that is very high (>>95%) given that
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J. Metlay, “Hypothetical Measles Epi Question,” email to David
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journal of law, medicine & ethics
Caplan, Hoke, Diamond, and Karshenboyem
9. It should be noted, further, that Mr. and Mrs. P might likewise pursue a claim for the negligent inliction of emotional
distress, due to the personal sufering they would experience
in losing their child. While such an action is certainly a viable
option, it has no direct bearing on our argument that liability
ought to be applied where harm has resulted from claiming a
philosophical objection to vaccination.
10. S. P. Teret and J. S. Vernick, “Gambling with the Health of
Others,” Michigan Law Review First Impressions 107, no. 110
(2009): 110-113, at 111.
11. John B. v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 324, 137 P.3d 153,
159 (2006); R. A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 141, 528 A.2d 1175, 1178
(1988).
12. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 265-66, 392 A.2d
1280, 1284 (1978).
13. John B., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324, 137 P.3d at 159.
14. Id.
15. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
16. B.N., 528 A.2d at 141-43, 528 A.2d at 1178-79.
17. R. A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 107; Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323,
326, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919).
18. John B., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324, 137 P.3d at 159 (internal quotation omitted).
19. B.N., 312 Md. at 142, 528 A.2d at 1179.
20. John B., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324-25, 137 P.3d at 160-61.
21. Id., at 325, 137 P.3d at 161 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
22. Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1884).
23. See Teret and Vernick, supra note 10, at 112.
24. Prosser and Keeton on the Torts 266 (William Lloyd Prosser et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
25. In re Christien M., 157 Misc. 2d 4, 21-22, 595 N.Y.S. 2d 606,
613 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992).
26. Model Penal Code § 202(2)(d) (1981).
27. See Teret and Vernick, supra note 10, at 112.
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