Who’s Houthi?

IF YOU were a tribe in Yemen and fancied a road or a school or the release of someone from prison, the tried and tested method in the past was to snatch a hostage or two. Usually the government gave in, and everyone went home happy. So it is perhaps natural that the Houthis, a revivalist movement for the Zaydi form of Shia Islam that has lately grown in strength from its base in the north of the country, should squeeze the government by holding Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, to ransom.

This is in effect what the Houthis, who prefer to call themselves Ansar Allah or the Partisans of God, have done since mid-August. They have brought in supporters and mounted an escalating series of sit-ins and crippling roadblocks to force concessions from the beleaguered president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The trouble is that the feeble Yemeni state is bankrupt. Mr Hadi, who must juggle demands from other factions, including Sunni Islamists, while also pursuing a war against al-Qaeda terrorists in the south, cannot afford to appear weak.

More pressingly, the Houthis’ tactic risks sparking clashes in the capital, and perhaps all-out mayhem on a scale not seen since Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s president of three decades, stepped down in November 2011 after a year of mass protests and street battles (and the near-assassination of Mr Saleh). This in turn could derail a political transition plan, in place since late 2011, which last January produced an agreement that is meant to lead to a fresh constitution that devolves federal power and lays the ground for elections.

The risk of chaos drew perilously close on September 9th when security forces opened fire on protesters gathered in front of the prime minister’s office, killing at least seven people. Abdelmalek al-Houthi, the Houthis’ leader, says his people come in peace and that they will leave as soon as their demands have been met. These include a return of generous government fuel subsidies, which were slashed in July as a desperate austerity measure. Such populist demands, as well as widespread resentment against the political class that still dominates the state, have broadened the insurgents’ support far beyond their religious and regional roots.

But Mr Hadi fears that the Houthis, once the underdogs in a stop-start civil war with Mr Saleh, but lately empowered by successive military victories against tribal and Islamist militias, will resort to violence if their demands are not met. He has bolstered security in Sana’a since the protests began. But after a spate of attacks this month by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the local franchise of the extremist movement, which left as many as 20 people dead, the president needs all the men he can muster to fight terrorism.

Arguing that stability is paramount, Mr Hadi has offered to replace the government with a cabinet more to the Houthis’ liking and to cut the fuel price by about 13%. But Mr Houthi is holding out for the full subsidy and a bigger role in the new government. He hints at new, “more painful” measures, and has warned that his patience is running out. The shooting of his supporters will have steeled his resolve.

Mr Hadi knows that an outright military victory against the Houthis, hardened by a decade of guerrilla warfare, is unlikely. Openly declaring war on the group would create the kind of security vacuum that allowed AQAP to take and hold territory in the south of the country in 2011. If Mr Hadi is to see out the remainder of his term he needs a deal, and fast.