Synopsis of the Book
Chapter One: A terrorist attack in Italy
This chapter describes the
discovery of the secret stay-behind army “Gladio” in
Italy. The chapter takes the reader back to the Peteano
terrorist attack of 31 May 1972. In that year an anonymous
phone call after the attack suggested that the left-wing
terrorist organization “Red Brigades” had carried out
the atrocity, and for many years Italy believed that
the crime had been carried out by the political left.
Yet in 1984 Italian judge Felice Casson reopened the
Peteano case after having discovered large-scale manipulations.
The chapter describes how Casson during his investigations
discovered the Italian secret stay-behind army “Gladio”
hidden within the military secret service and how it
had linked up with right-wing terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra
who confessed to having carried out the Peteano terrorist
attack. The chapter focuses on the agitated Italian public
debate that followed when Vinciguerra exposed the so
called “strategy of tension” through which members of
the secret stay-behind armies and the military secret services had manipulated the public through terrorism. The secret
armies supplied right wing terrorists with explosives
to carry out terrorist attacks on the Italian population
who were thereafter blamed on the communist party and
the political left in general in order to discredit the
political opponent. "The terrorist line was followed by camouflaged people, people belonging to the
security apparatus, or those linked to the state apparatus
through rapport or collaboration”, Vincenzo Vinciguerra
testified. Right-wing organisations across Western Europe
“were being mobilised into the battle as part of an anti-communist
strategy originating not with organisations deviant from
the institutions of power, but from the state itself,
and specifically from within the ambit of the state's
relations within the Atlantic Alliance."
Chapter Two: A scandal shocks Western Europe
This chapter describes how
the democracies in Western Europe in 1990 dealt with
the discovery of the secret stay-behind armies in their
respective countries. The chapter shows that only three
countries, namely Italy, Belgium and Switzerland, carried
out a parliamentary investigation into their secret armies
and thereafter presented a public report, and details
how all other countries dealt with the issue behind closed
doors. The chapter describes how the press reacted, with
for instance the British daily the Observer speaking
of "the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II". Furthermore this chapter relates how the parliament of the European Union (EU)
on 22 November 1990 dealt with the issue and how for
instance Italian MP Falqui had insisted: "Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, there is one fundamental moral and political
necessity, in regard to the new Europe that we are progressively
building. This Europe will have no future if it is not
founded on truth, on the full transparency of its institutions
in regard to the dark plots against democracy that have
turned upside down the history, even in recent times,
of many European states. There will be no future, ladies
and gentlemen, if we do not remove the idea of having
lived in a kind of double state - one open and democratic,
the other clandestine and reactionary. That is why we
want to know what and how many "Gladio" networks there have been in recent years in the Member States of the European
Community."
Chapter Three: The silence of NATO, CIA and MI6
This chapter describes the
reactions of NATO, the CIA and MI6 to the discovery of
the secret stay-behind armies. The chapter details how
NATO reacted defensive and at times inconsistent and
tells the story of how NATO Spokesman Jean Marcotta on
Monday 5 November 1990 at SHAPE headquarters in Mons,
Belgium, first denied that NATO had ever been involved
in secret warfare, whereupon the next day another NATO
spokesman explained that NATO's statement of the previous
day had been false, adding that NATO never commented
on matters of military secrecy. Thereafter NATO ambassadors
on 7 November 1990 were informed behind closed doors
by NATO secretary-general Manfred Wörner and Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) US General John Galvin.
The chapter describes how written requests by the author
for further information on the stay-behind networks and
NATO’s stay-behind command centres “Clandestine Planning
Committee” (CPC) and “Allied Clandestine Committee” (ACC)
were declined in subsequent years. The chapter reports how during the same years specific data on CPC and ACC surfaced in Italy. General
Gerardo Serravalle, who commanded the Italian Gladio
secret army from 1971 to 1974, and General Paolo Inzerilli,
who commanded the Italian stay-behind Gladio from 1974
to 1986, both confirmed in their books on the topic that
the ACC and the CPC had been founded at the explicit
order of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE).
The chapter also records how
the foreign secret service of the United States, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has somewhat inconsistently
both commented and refused to comment on its stay-behind
armies in Western Europe. William Colby, Director of
the CIA from 1973 to 1976, in his book Honorable Men
related that the covert action branch of the CIA, the
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), had after World
War Two “undertaken a major program of building, throughout
those Western European countries that seemed likely targets
for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence
trade were known as 'stay-behind nets', clandestine infrastructures
of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called
into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the
time came.” Several years later Admiral Stansfield Turner,
director of the CIA from 1977 to 1981, strictly refused
to answer any questions about Gladio in a television
interview in Italy in December 1990. When with respect
for the victims of the terrorist attacks the journalist insisted and repeated the question the former CIA
director angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted: "I said, no questions about Gladio!" whereupon the interview was over. The chapter also relates how academics at
the distinguished National Security Archive at George
Washington University in Washington filed a Freedom of
Information (FOIA) request with the CIA on 15 April 1991 which was declined. It also notes how a FOIA request
which the author handed in on 14 December 2000 was first
declined, whereupon the author appealed to which the
CIA replied that it will provide an answer in the future
which is still lacking. The chapter also details that
the British foreign secret service MI6 with its legendary
obsession for secrecy did not take a position on stay-behind
questions at all but confirmed its involvement through
a somewhat unusual channel in the “secret wars” exhibition
in the London based Imperial War Museum in 1995.
Chapter Four: The secret war in the United Kingdom
The chapter takes the reader
back to World War Two when British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill ordered that under the label “Special Operations
Executive” (SOE) a secret army had to be created "to set Europe ablaze”. SOE operated behind enemy lines, and following World War
Two the British were widely recognised as the leading
experts in secret warfare. The chapter describes how
the British foreign secret service MI6 together with
the British Special Forces “Special Air Service” (SAS)
and the CIA during the Cold War set up and trained the
secret stay-behind armies in Western Europe. Among those
trained by the SAS ranged Decimo Garau, an instructor
at the Italian Gladio base Centro Addestramento Guastatori
(CAG) on Capo Marargiu in Sardinia who recalled: "I was in England for a week at Poole, invited by the Special Forces. I was there
for a week and I did some training with them. I did a
parachute jump over the Channel." Reinhold Geijer, a former Swedish military professional and member of the Swedish
stay-behind army recalled that his training in Britain
was very tough: "In 1959 I went, via London, to a farm outside Eaton. This was done under the
strictest secrecy procedures, with for instance a forged
passport. I was not even allowed to call my wife. The
aim of the training was to learn how to use dead letter
box techniques to receive and send secret messages, and
other James Bond style exercises. The British were very
tough. I sometimes had the feeling that we were overdoing
it." The chapter concludes by observing the United Kingdom to this day has been very
reluctant to comment on the secret war. In 1990 British
Defence Secretary Tom King, in the midst of preparations
for the war against Saddam Hussein, refused to answer
stay-behind questions and went on the record with the
statement: "I am not sure what particular hot potato you're chasing after. It sounds wonderfully
exciting, but I'm afraid I'm quite ignorant about it.
I'm better informed about the Gulf." And also years later journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy lamented: "The silence in Whitehall and the almost total lack of curiosity among MPs about
an affair in which Britain was so centrally involved
are remarkable."
Chapter Five: The secret war in the United States
This chapter describes US
secret warfare operations in Western Europe from the
end of the Second World War in 1945 to the end of the
Cold War in 1991. It relates how the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC)
were created and how directive NSC 10/2 gave them the
task to engage in secret warfare. The chapter details
how the CIA together with the support of the Pentagon
set up the secret stay-behind armies in Western Europe
and how the secret war was fought. It describes the tactics
and strategies used, including the “strategy of tension”
as presented in the Field Manual FM 30-31B: "There may be times when Host Country Governments show passivity or indecision
in the face of communist subversion and according to
the interpretation of the US secret services do not react
with sufficient effectiveness. Most often such situations
come about when the revolutionaries temporarily renounce
the use of force and thus hope to gain an advantage,
as the leaders of the host country wrongly consider the
situation to be secure. US army intelligence must have
the means of launching special operations which will
convince Host Country Governments and public opinion
of the reality of the insurgent danger … These special
operations must remain strictly secret …Only those persons
who are acting against the revolutionary uprising shall
know of the involvement of the US Army in the internal
affairs of an allied country. The fact, that the involvement
of forces of the US military goes deeper shall not become
known under any circumstances." The chapter concludes by observing that the United States have until today refused
to talk about this difficult aspect of the transatlantic
partnership, which in turn has lead to a certain criticism
in Europe.
Chapter Six: The secret war in Italy
This chapter describes the
complicated and violent history of the secret Cold War
in Italy. It describes how the United States in a strategic
gamble weakened the Italian Communists and Socialists
by supporting the conservative Democrazia Italiana (DCI)
whom they manoeuvred into power in the 1948 rigged elections
and backed in the decades to come till the Cold War ended.
The chapter describes how the Gladio stay-behind army
became an asset in this strategy and how the military
secret service linked up with right-wing terrorists to
manipulate the population with the so-called “strategy
of tension”. The chapter relates that Italy suffered
from both left and right-wing terrorism during the Cold
War. Large-scale right-wing terror started in 1969 when
in Milan the “Piazza Fontana massacre” killed 16 and
maimed and wounded 80 most of which were farmers who
after a day on the market had deposited their modest
earnings in the Farmer's Bank on the Piazza Fontana in
Milan. The terror was wrongly blamed on the Communists and the extreme left, traces were covered up and arrests followed immediately.
In 1974 another bomb exploded in Brescia in the midst
of an anti-fascist demonstration, killing eight and injuring
and maiming 102, followed by a terror attack in the same
year on the Rome to Munich train “Italicus Express”,
killing 12 and injuring and maiming 48. The chapter describes
how the terror wave culminated on a sunny afternoon during
the Italian national holiday when on 2 August 1980 a
massive explosion ripped through the waiting room of
the second class at the Bologna railway station, killing
85 people in the blast and seriously injuring and maiming
a further 200. "You had to attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown
people far removed from any political game” right-wing
terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra later explained. “The
reason was quite simple. They were supposed to force
these people, the Italian public, to turn to the State
to ask for greater security. This is the political logic
that lies behind all the massacres and the bombings which
remain unpunished, because the State cannot convict itself
or declare itself responsible for what happened.”
Chapter Seven: The secret war in France
This chapter relates how secret
stay-behind armies linked to NATO were set up in France
following World War Two. It shows how the clandestine
forces, designed to fight the strong French Communist
party as well as to prepare against a Soviet invasion,
tragically target the French government during the process
that lead to the independence of the French colony Algeria
in 1962. Following defeats in World War Two and Vietnam
sectors of the French military and intelligence opposed
the plan of French President Charles de Gaulle to grant
Algeria independence, as in their eyes this plan meant
yet another defeat for the proud French army. When President
de Gaulle proceeded with his plan sections of the French
military and intelligence took up arms against the government
in Paris. Admiral Pierre Lacoste, director of the French
military secret DGSE from 1982 to 1985 under President
Francois Mitterand, confirmed after the discovery of
the secret NATO armies in 1990 that some "terrorist actions" against de Gaulle and his Algerian peace plan were carried out by groups that
included "a limited number of people" from the French stay-behind network. Yet Lacoste insisted that he believed that
Soviet contingency plans for invasion nevertheless justified
the stay-behind program. The chapter concludes by observing
that France to this very day has been very reluctant
to investigate the history of its secret armies as well
as their links to both the CIA and NATO.
Chapter Eight: The secret war in Spain
This chapter investigates
how the Spanish secret stay-behind army developed during
the period when Spain was a right wing dictatorship under
Francisco Franco. It relates how the country served as
a save haven and how according to Italian investigations
right-wing terrorists who had cooperated with the Gladio
stay-behind armies were regularly flown to Spain after
having carried out a terrorist attack. In Spain they
were protected from further investigations and in return
offered their services to Franco. Among the most notorious
right-wing terrorists in Spain ranged Stefano delle Chiaie
who had allegedly carried out well over a thousand bloodthirsty
attacks, including an estimated 50 murders. Members of
Delle Chiaie's secret army, including Italian right-winger
Aldo Tisei, later confessed to Italian magistrates that
during their Spanish exile they had tracked down and
killed anti-fascists on behalf of the Spanish secret
service. The chapter relates how following the death
of Franco in 1975 the country entered a fragile transition period during which further terrorist attacks were carried
out in an attempt to prevent the Spanish left from regaining
strength. Among these ranged in 1977 the Atocha massacre
in Madrid which had targeted a lawyer's office closely
linked to the Spanish communist party and killed five
lawyers. The Italian Senate investigation into Gladio
notes that when Delle Chiaie was arrested in 1987 in
Venezuela he made it clear that he had not acted alone
but had at all times closely cooperated with the secret
services in Spain, Italy, Chile and other countries: "The massacres have taken place. That is a fact. The secret services have covered
up the traces. That is another fact."
Chapter Nine: The secret war in Portugal
The chapter describes how
similar to neighbouring Spain also in Portugal the secret
army during the Cold War operated within the context
of a right-wing dictatorship. The Portuguese military
secret service PIDE of dictator António de Oliveira Salazar
cooperated closely with the secret army who not only
helped to support the dictatorship through assassination
operations in Portugal but operated also overseas in
the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Operating under the
code name “Aginter Press” the secret army allegedly was
involved in the assassinations of Humberto Delgado, Portuguese
opposition leader, killed 14 February 1965, Amilcar Cabral,
leader of the national liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau
and one of Africa's foremost revolutionary figures, killed
20 January 20 1973, and Eduardo Mondlane, leader and
President of the Mocambique liberation party and movement
FRELIMO (Frente de Liberacao de Mocambique), killed in
colonial Mocambique on 3 February 1969. The chapter relates
how Captain Yves Guerain Serac, a French born militant catholic and anti-communist, played a central role in
the secret war in Portugal. Serac was convinced that
the West had to use terror, assassinations and manipulation
to fight communism: "In the first phase of our political activity we must create chaos in all structures
of the regime. Two forms of terrorism can provoke such
a situation: The blind terrorism (committing massacres
indiscriminately which cause a large number of victims),
and the selective terrorism (eliminate chosen persons).
This destruction of the state must be carried out as
much as possible under the cover of 'communist activities'
... After that, we must intervene at the heart of the
military, the juridical power and the church, in order
to influence popular opinion, suggest a solution, and
clearly demonstrate the weakness of the present legal
apparatus ... Popular opinion must be polarised in such
a way, that we are being presented as the only instrument
capable of saving the nation. It is obvious that we will
need considerable financial resources to carry out such
operations."
Chapter Ten: The secret war in Belgium
This chapter relates that
Belgium, together with Switzerland and Italy, was among
the very few countries in Western Europe which following
the discoveries of the NATO stay-behind armies in 1990
set up a parliamentary commission to investigate the
national secret army and presented a public report on
the subject. Belgian Socialist Defence Minister Guy Coeme,
who had been unaware of the existence of the secret armies,
had insisted on television that he wanted to know the
entire history of the Belgian secret army, even if that
included links to terrorism: “Furthermore I want to know
whether there exists a link between the activities of
this secret network, and the wave of crime and terror
which our country suffered from during the past years." Coeme was referring to the years 1983 to 1985 when in the geographic area around
Brussels called Brabant 14 particularly brutal terrorist
attacks on shoppers in supermarkets left 28 dead and
many more injured. The chapter relates how the Belgian
Senate found that the secret army was code-named SDRA8
and that it was directly linked to NATO’s stay-behind
centres Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and Clandestine
Planning Committee (CPC). It also details how the Belgian
Senators were unable to clarify whether the secret army
had anything to do with the Brabant terror as the Belgian
military secret service refused to cooperate. Presenting
the larger historical context of the secret war in Belgium
the chapter draws on the data from Journalist Allan Francovich
who in his television documentary on the secret NATO
armies had suggested that the Belgian secret army SDRA8
had linked up with the Belgian right-wing organization
Westland New Post (WNP). “There were projects” WNP member
Michel Libert confirmed to Francovich. Allegedly he had been told: “'You, Mr. Libert, know nothing about why we're
doing this. Nothing at all. All we ask is that your group,
with cover from the Gendarmerie, with cover from Security,
carry out a job. Target: The supermarkets. Where are
they? What kind of locks are there? What sort of protection
do they have that could interfere with our operations?
Does the store manager lock up? Or do they use an outside
security company? We carried out the orders and sent
in our reports: Hours of opening and closing. Everything
you want to know about a supermarket. What was this for?
This was one amongst hundreds of missions. Something
that had to be done. But the use it was all put to, that
is the big question."
Chapter Eleven: The secret war in the Netherlands
This chapter relates how in the Netherlands a secret stay-behind army was set
up following the traumatic occupation experience in World
War Two. The network, which was never linked to acts
of terrorism, consisted of the two branches “Intelligence”
(I) and “Operations” (O), and was referred to as “I&O”. The chapter relates how the Netherlands dealt with the exposure of the military
secret and why there was no public investigation nor
a parliamentary report. "Successive Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers have always preferred not to
inform other members of their cabinets or Parliament", Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Christian Democrats party told parliament
in 1990, adding that he was proud that some 30 Ministers
had kept the secret. The chapter details how some parliamentarians
were greatly surprised when the secret was lifted and
contemplated that democratic checks and balances had
been violated. "I don't particularly worry that there was, and perhaps still is, such a thing”,
Hans Dijkstal of the opposition Liberals observed in
parliament. “What I do have problems with is that until
last night Parliament was never told".
Chapter Twelve: The secret war in Luxemburg
This chapter tells the story
of how Luxemburg prepared for the secret war in Europe.
Dutch and Belgian stay-behind research suggests that
in March 1948 the so-called "Western Union Clandestine Committee", short WUCC, was set up with the task to carry out peace-time preparations in
Luxemburg, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and France against an eventual Soviet invasion. Following
the creation of NATO in 1949 the stay-behind coordination
centre WUCC in April 1951 handed over its functions to
the newly created Clandestine Planning Committee CPC
operating under the control of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. The chapter
concludes that the limited data available so far suggests
that Luxemburg was part of the network of the NATO secret
armies from the very beginning but was never involved
in acts of terrorism. Or as Prime Minister Jacques Santer
phrased it in front of parliament: “The only activities
of these persons, and this is the case for the entire
time period in which this network has existed, have been
limited to the training in preparation of their missions,
including the training of how to behave individually
in a hostile environment, and how to coordinate efforts with allied countries."
Chapter Thirteen: The secret war in Denmark
This chapter looks at the
secret history of the stay-behind army in Denmark which
remains fragmentary because the Danish parliament decided
to deal with the issue behind closed doors. The chapter
presents the testimonies of former members of the Danish
secret army who explained that the stay-behind was never
linked to terrorism. The anti-communist secret army was
code-named "Absalon” after the Danish Bishop who with the sword in his hand had defeated
the Russians in the Middle Ages, an event commemorated
in Copenhagen by a large bronze statue of Absalon on
horseback in battle gear. The chapter details how Defence
Minister Knud Enggaard was reluctant to inform the Danish
parliament Folketing in 1990 and first rejected the claim
that "any kind" of NATO supported CIA organisation had been erected in Denmark, adding that "further pieces of information on a secret service operation in case of an occupation
is classified material, even highly classified material
and I am therefore prohibited from giving any further
information in the Danish parliament."
Chapter Fourteen: The secret war in Norway
This chapter details how strongly
the Norwegian planning for a stay-behind army was influenced
by the occupation experience during World War Two. Never
again, the heads of the Norwegian military concluded,
was the country to be occupied without a resistance network
in place. The chapter details how the Norwegian Intelligence
Service (NIS) under Vilhelm Evang set up and controlled
the secret stay-behind army after World War Two. The
Norwegian stay-behind was at no time involved in domestic
terror. The chapter details how Evang stirred the secret
army through a crisis which came in 1957 when NIS discovered
that NATO was spying on Norwegians setting up a blacklist
of persons sharing strongly pacifist and negative attitudes
to NATO. Evangs was extremely angry and protested strongly
during a meeting of the stay-behind centre CPC in Paris
in the same year: “When high ranking persons in Norway
are being included on such a blacklist, then something
must be wrong” Evangs stressed. “My government also views
this in a very serious light, and I have standing orders not to take part in international
planning if such activities are going on … As far as
Norway is concerned, our interest in CPC planning as
such has since 1954 declined steadily because there is
no future in it for us. We are of the opinion that we
are developing a Stay Behind which is to be used at home
for the purpose of liberation from an occupation." Only when NATO assured to never again violate Norwegian sovereignty did the
NIS resume the stay-behind cooperation.
Chapter Fifteen: The secret war in Germany
This chapter relates how following
World War Two a number of Nazis were integrated into
the German secret armies. It tells the story of how a
branch of the German stay-behind army was already discovered
in 1952 under the name "Bund Deutscher Jugend - Technischer Dienst" (BDJ TD) and the mysterious circumstances under which all arrested right-wing
members of the BDJ TD walked free. The chapter details
how Germany during the secret Cold War did not only suffer
from the left wing terrorism of the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion),
but also from right-wing terrorism which on 26 September
1980 in a bomb terror attack in the midst of the popular
Munich October festival killed 13 and wounded 213, many
gravely. Gundolf Köhler, a 21-year-old right wing member
of the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann according to the police
investigation had planted the Munich bomb and died in
the terrorist attack. The members of the Wehrsportgruppe
Hoffmann testified that forest ranger Heinz Lembke had
supplied them with explosives. The claim that right-winger
Lembke controlled large underground arms caches was confirmed
on 26 October 1981 when forest workers by chance stumbled
across an underground arsenal of 33 caches containing
automatic weapons, chemical combat equipment Arsen and
Zyankali, about 14'000 shots of munitions, 50 anti tank guns, 156 kg of explosives, as well as 230 explosive
devices and 258 hand grenades. Presumably the Lembke
arms caches were part of the German stay-behind set up
for the emergency of a Soviet invasion, and Lembke himself
was probably a secret soldier. The chapter tells the
story how Lembke was arrested and in prison informed
his interrogator that he might reveal the entire truth
soon, whereupon on 1 November 1981, Lembke was found
hanging on a rope from the ceiling of his prison cell.
The chapter concludes by noting the difficulties of the
German secret service BND to inform the German parliament
and public on the secret armies when they were rediscovered
in 1990.
Chapter Sixteen: The secret war in Greece
This chapter tells the story
of how the Greek stay-behind army LOK (Lochos Oreinon
Katadromon) was involved in the at times violent Cold
War history of the country. „In the eyes of senior CIA
officials, the groups under the direction of the paramilitary
branch are seen as long term ‘insurance’ for the interests
of the United States in Greece,” former CIA agent Philipp
Agee related, “to be used to assist or to direct the
possible overthrow of an 'unsympathetic' Greek government.
'Unsympathetic' of course to American manipulation." The chapter relates how tensions in the country between the political left and
the political right intensified when in the 1963 elections
the leftist Centre Union under George Papandreou secured
42 per cent of the vote and Papandreou was elected Prime
Minister. It tells the story how Papandreou in a secret
war became the target of Jack Maury, chief of the CIA
station in Greece, and how Maury together with Greek
royalists and right-wing officers of the Greek military
manoeuvred Papandreou out of office by royal prerogative.
One month before the latter was about to return to power
through the national elections in May 1967 the military
coup d’état was carried out which shocked Greece and
the world. The chapter relates how the Greek secret stay-behind
army LOK was involved in the coup and how 78-year-old
George Papandreou was arrested in his house just outside
the capital Athens and how he was imprisoned along with
thousands of citizens, some of which were tortured. The
chapter relates how many years later Andreas, the son of George Papandreou, became Prime Minister, discovered the secret
NATO army, and in memory of his father gave the orders
to close it down.
Chapter Seventeen: The secret war in Turkey
The chapter tells the story
of how the secret NATO stay-behind army - which in Turkey
operated under the code-name “Counter-Guerrilla” - prepared
not only against a Soviet invasion but also targeted
domestic opponents and during the Cold War became repeatedly
linked to acts of violence. According to Turkish General
Talat Turhan the Counter Guerrilla was involved in torture
following the military coup d’etat in 1971. Turhan was
himself among the torture victims and later testified:
„Then they told me that I was now 'in the hands of a
Counter Guerrilla unit operating under the high command
of the Army outside the constitution and the laws.' …
In this villa I was with tied up arms and feet chained
to a bed for a month and tortured in a way which a human
being has difficulty to imagine. It was under these circumstances
that I first was made familiar with the name Counter-Guerrillas." The chapter relates how the Turkish secret army in the 1980s was involved in
clandestine terror operations against the Curds, and
how difficult it was for the Turkish democracy to face
the history of the Counter-Guerilla when the secret NATO
stay-behind armies were discovered in 1990. "When it was discovered in 1990 that Italy had an underground organization called
Gladio, organized by NATO and controlled and financed
by the CIA, which was linked to acts of terrorism within
the country,” General Turhan recalled, “Turkish and foreign
journalists approached me and published my explanations
as they knew that I have been researching the field for
17 years … In Turkey the special forces in the style
of Gladio are called Counter-Guerrilla by the public“
Turhan explained to the press and once again lamented
that „despite all my efforts and initiatives of political
parties, democratic mass organizations and the media
the Counter-Guerrilla has still not been investigated."
Conclusion
The book concludes by noting
that the data available so far shows that the NATO secret
stay-behind armies existed and that for the first time
long hidden aspects of the secret war in Western Europe
can be studied in a larger international context. The
conclusion highlights that the data on the NATO stay-behind
armies as well as on the links to terrorism and crime
remains fragmentary and notes that large differences
exist from country to country. In some countries there
are links to terrorism and crime, while in other countries
the secret soldier strictly limited their operations
to training for a Soviet invasion. What did NATO know?
What did the Pentagon, the CIA and MI6 know? Which terrorist
attacks were deviations, and what was planned? Within
the context of the so called "war on terrorism" the data on NATO's stay-behind armies opens up an entire field of so far unexplored
questions and raises fundamental questions also on the
“strategy of tension” for which the answers are still
lacking.
DANIELE GANSER is a Senior
Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.