An unholy pact

THE House of Saud has been written off many times: when Arab nationalism swept through the Middle East; when the mullahs dethroned the Shah of Iran; when jihadists turned their suicide-bombs against the kingdom. Yet the sons of Abdel Aziz bin Saud have confounded all challengers. This week they staged a smooth transition from King Abdullah, who died on January 23rd, to his half-brother, Salman. And, for all the kingdom’s harshness at home and fuelling of extremism abroad, the world’s leaders flocked to Riyadh. Barack Obama cut short a trip to India to pay homage to the new king.

This is a craven spectacle from democracies that claim to uphold universal human rights. When authoritarians elsewhere point to the Western silence on Saudi Arabia’s treatment of women, and its ruthless suppression of dissent, and cry double standards, they have a point. The West’s relationship with the Al Sauds must change. So must the dynasty itself.

The devil they know

The Al Sauds have kept power through a double Faustian pact: with the West, which has provided security in exchange for oil; and with Wahhabi clerics, who offer religious legitimacy in return for the state’s power to enforce and spread their intolerant version of Islam. That dual bargain is under strain. Wahhabism is feeding anti-Western radicals, while many Western observers see little difference between jihadists who decapitate foes in Syria and Saudi henchmen who behead adulteresses. The question is whether the West should continue the humiliating coddling, or risk something worse by pushing for change.

The “realist” argument should not be dismissed out of hand. It is better to have the Al Sauds—with their oil, wealth and control of Muslim holy places—as friends than as foes. The repudiation of jihadism is best done by pious Muslims such as them. And as Arab republics collapse—from Libya to Syria, Iraq and Yemen—the monarchies are proving more resilient.

Moreover, odd as it may seem, the Al Sauds often stand at the reformist end of the narrow Saudi spectrum. Cautiously, King Abdullah gave some space to women in public life, promoted their education and encouraged young Saudis to gain Western training. He convinced fellow Arab leaders to make Israel an important peace offer in 2002. If the Al Sauds were toppled their replacement would not be a nice democratic parliament; it would be chaos or, maybe, jihadists.

But this realism is not that realistic. The main risk for the Al Sauds is that they move too slowly and they may be overwhelmed. The Wahhabism they nurture endangers not just the outside world, but the dynasty itself. It sustains jihadist ideology, stokes sectarianism and exposes the monarchy to charges of hypocrisy. Meanwhile the old rentier state that bought obedience with generous subsidies and overt piousness is weakening. Oil revenues have fallen sharply, meaning jobs for young Saudi men are in short supply. Women are entering employment; social media are making ordinary Saudis less biddable (see article). To govern this evolving country, the Al Sauds must accept more pluralism, in both politics and faith. And they need to be pushed down this path.

So Western leaders should maintain the ties but ditch the sycophancy. Their friendship should be more conditional on reform—specifically the taming of Saudi Arabia’s savage religious judiciary. Visits like Mr Obama’s should follow the same pattern as they do in Russia or China: they should include formal protests about human rights and public meetings with dissidents, with non-Wahhabis (including the Shias), and with women. After all, friends speak plainly. Supplicants who kiss the gold-braided gown are mere courtiers.